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During oral argument in United States v. Texas, Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justice Alito expressed—or feigned—confusion about the nature 
of the status of non-citizens granted deferred action, respectively asking 
the Solicitor General, incredulously, “Lawfully present does not mean 
you’re legally present in the United States[?]”1 and “[H]ow is it possible 
to lawfully work in the United States without lawfully being in the United 
 
 1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27:23-25, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 
(2016) (No. 15-674), https://perma.cc/N7GS-69C4. 
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States?”2 The Solicitor General tried to explain to the conservative jus-
tices that “lawfully present” has a very non-literal meaning under immi-
gration law, but without much success.3 He could have responded that 
there is well-established precedent in American courts4 recognizing that 
“[u]nlawful presence can be inconclusive in several ways. It can change, 
it can occupy a gray area between lawful and unlawful, and its conse-
quences are highly uncertain.”5 There is perhaps no more reflective an 
example of this than the doctrine called “permanently residing under the 
color of law,” abbreviated by the peculiar acronym PRUCOL. 
Designed by the 92nd Congress, PRUCOL designates eligibility for 
federal public benefits for those non-citizens whose status is “both outside 
the law and inside the law.”6 PRUCOL, therefore, does not describe a 
non-citizen’s immigration status but rather the public benefits eligibility 
that a non-citizen enjoys as a product of their immigration status or lack 
thereof. It is distinguished from two other immigrant eligibility catego-
ries: “qualified aliens”7 and “lawfully present” immigrants. Qualified al-
iens are lawful permanent residents, refugees, and those with similar 
longer-term statuses,8 while lawfully present immigrants include those 
with usually shorter-term statuses, such as temporary or non-immigrant 
visa holders.9 The former category, along with PRUCOL, applies to sev-
eral kinds of benefits, whereas the lawfully present category applies only 
to health insurance under the Affordable Care Act. PRUCOL, however, 
generally describes someone without immigration status or in the process 
of obtaining such status.10 The PRUCOL doctrine was meant to be “adapt-
able and to be interpreted over time in accordance with experience, de-
velopments in the law, and the like”—that is, “organic and fluid, rather 
than prescriptive or formulaic.”11 In other words, PRUCOL was designed 
to be vague. 
The vagueness of the doctrine creates challenges of applicability to 
the real-world circumstances of non-citizens who are applying for public 
assistance benefits, not just those who are before courts. The doctrine also 
presents challenges for the social service agencies that must determine 
 
 2 Id. at 28:12-14. 
 3 Id. at 27:9-22, 29:6-16, 19-25. 
 4 See, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 (2d Cir. 1985); Holley v. Lavine, 553 
F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 5 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 52 (2014). 
 6 Castillo v. Jackson, 566 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 7 Please note the term “alien” is used here as a direct quote of the law. The authors of 
this article do not endorse the use of this term. 
 8 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2018). 
 9 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(4)(i)-(iii) (2020). 
 10 See infra Part III. 
 11 Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1571 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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immigrant eligibility for said benefits, and also for attorneys who may 
represent such individuals in immigration cases, public benefit cases, and 
sometimes both. 
This article aims to provide guidance for legal practitioners and rep-
resentatives of PRUCOL non-citizens attempting to qualify for public as-
sistance benefits in those limited jurisdictions that still use the PRUCOL 
doctrine to determine benefit eligibility. Part I provides a history of the 
doctrine. Part II provides a summary of the very limited scholarship on 
the PRUCOL doctrine, noting that no comprehensive discussion of 
PRUCOL has been written in the last two decades. Part III is a practi-
tioner’s guide to applying the PRUCOL doctrine. It presents a taxonomy 
of all judicial, and many administrative, decisions at the state and federal 
level on the PRUCOL doctrine. Part III is meant to provide practitioners 
with authority to support arguments for PRUCOL eligibility for real-
world clients stuck “both outside and inside” the vague boundaries of law-
ful immigration status. Part IV concludes by encouraging practitioners to 
use Part III to advance their arguments for PRUCOL client benefit access. 
I. A HISTORY OF THE PRUCOL DOCTRINE 
A. The Term “Color of Law” 
The phrase “under color of law” goes back at least as far as the 13th 
century, when it was used to describe those actions of state officials that 
appeared to be authorized by law but were not.12 The phrase has been used 
in American law since the 19th century, notably in civil rights statutes such 
as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a civil remedy for the deprivation 
of constitutional rights perpetrated ‘under color of law’” or with its osten-
sible authorization.13 “Color” refers to that which seems to be lawful but 
is not.14 In this context, the Supreme Court has defined “un-
der color of law” as the “[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state 
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the 
authority of state law.”15 
It is this part of the definition, “clothed with the authority of state 
law,” that most applies to the phrase “color of law” as it is used in the 
 
 12 See Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 
327 (1992). 
 13 See Sarah T. Biolsi, Civil Rights/Tax Law—”Under Color of” Internal Revenue Laws: 
The Role of United States v. Temple and Section 7214 in the “Under Color of Law” Debate, 
31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 115, 117-21 (2009); see also Gillar v. Emp’t Div., 717 P.2d 131, 135 
(Or. 1986) (en banc). 
 14 See Winter, supra note 12, at 327-28. 
 15 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). 
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PRUCOL doctrine.16 The Second Circuit has described such an action as 
“that which an official does by virtue of power, as well as what he does 
by virtue of right.”17 In the immigration law context, it is usually the ex-
ecution of prosecutorial discretion that renders a non-citizen someone 
who is residing under “color of law,” that is to say, clothed by the power 
of the state with permission to remain in the United States, if not the legal 
right to do so.18 In 1972, Congress first applied the “color of law” lan-
guage to non-citizen recipients of the government’s discretionary permis-
sion to remain as a way of designating which non-citizens could enjoy 
access to public assistance while they were permitted to remain in the 
United States. 
B. The Statutory Origins of “PRUCOL” 
The Supreme Court has treated decisions by the federal political 
branches to deny public benefits to non-citizens as an inherent part of the 
political branches’ “plenary power” over immigration policy.19 Congress 
exercised that power in 1972 when it amended the Social Security Act to 
create the first restriction of benefits based on citizenship status, exclud-
ing anyone who was not PRUCOL from the Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI) cash benefit program.20 As professor Janet M. Calvo ex-
plained in her 1987 article on non-citizen eligibility for federal 
entitlements, lawmakers originally intended to restrict SSI to legal per-
manent residents, but some worried about states bearing the financial bur-
den of caring for the disabilities of non-citizens who lacked permanent 
residence but were still in the United States with the government’s per-
mission.21 Calvo explained that senators from Florida addressed this prob-
lem by proposing an amendment that eventually became the intentionally 
 
 16 See a thorough discussion of the history of the “color of law” language as it applies to 
the PRUCOL doctrine in Gillar, 717 P.2d at 135-37. 
 17 Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 18 E.g., id. (“[P]laintiff is in . . . a minuscule sub-class of aliens who, although unlawfully 
residing in the United States, are each individually covered by a letter from the Department of 
Justice stating that the Immigration and Naturalization Services ‘does not contemplate enforc-
ing [their] departure from the United States at this time.’”); cf. SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, 
BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 7 
(2015) (“A favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law identifies the 
agency’s authority to refrain from asserting the full scope of the agency’s enforcement author-
ity in a particular case.”). 
 19 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-83 (1976). 
 20 See Social Security Amendments of 1972, § 1614, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 
1329, 1471; Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164, 1182 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 21 Janet M. Calvo, Alien Status Restrictions on Eligibility for Federally Funded Assis-
tance Programs, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 411 (1987). 
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broadly applicable “permanently residing in the United States under color 
of law” status.22 
Between the original enactment of Medicaid in 1965 and 1973, there 
were actually no citizenship-based restrictions on Medicaid, the federal 
public health insurance program for low-income people.23 At one point, 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (the administrator of 
Medicaid and predecessor of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices) even recommended that the law stay that way.24 However, in 1973, 
the Department implemented a new regulation placing restrictions on 
non-citizen Medicaid eligibility.25 This first regulation on non-citizen el-
igibility limited non-emergency care to the PRUCOL category, borrow-
ing its language straight from the SSI statute passed during the previous 
year.26 
The PRUCOL restriction on Medicaid eligibility was a mere regula-
tion, and Congress did not pass a statute to apply the PRUCOL restriction 
to non-emergency Medicaid until 1986, when the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act codified the Medicaid PRUCOL restriction into federal 
law.27 As the House Budget Committee report expressly said, “The Com-
mittee intends that the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] and the 
States broadly interpret the phrase ‘under color of law’ to include all of 
the categories recognized by immigration law, policy and practice in ef-
fect at the time.”28 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”)—called Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) after 1996—is a cash 
entitlement program for low-income adults with children who did not be-
come subject to PRUCOL restrictions until 1981.29 Thus, AFDC became 
 
 22 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B)(i) (2018)). 
 23 See Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1211 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Lewis, 663 F. Supp. 
at 1181-82 (referring to 1973 as the beginning of federal citizenship requirements for Medicaid 
eligibility and discussing a 1972 proposal that would have outright banned such citizenship 
requirements for state Medicaid plans). 
 24 Lewis, 663 F. Supp. at 1182 (“In fact, on June 16, 1972, the Secretary proposed a reg-
ulation that would require rejection of any state Medicaid plan that would ‘exclude an other-
wise eligible individual on the basis . . . of his alien status’”) (quoting 37 Fed. Reg. 1977 
(1972)). 
 25 See Grinker, 965 F.2d at 1211-13 (discussing the evolution of citizenship requirements 
for Medicaid in light of Congressional amendments to the SSI program and the codification 
of such exclusions in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986). 
 26 See Lewis, 663 F. Supp. at 1182 (citing language incorporated in 42 C.F.R. § 435.402 
as originating from the SSI’s alienage requirement in the Social Security Amendments of 
1972). 
 27 H.R. REP. NO. 99-727, at 111 (1986). 
 28 Id. 
 29 45 C.F.R. § 233.50(b); see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No 
97-35, § 2320(a), 95 Stat. 357; Lewis, 663 F. Supp. at 1182. 
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the fourth entitlement program to be set by the PRUCOL designation. It 
likewise borrowed the PRUCOL language from its SSI and Medicaid reg-
ulation predecessors.30 The Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program 
(“SNAP”), more colloquially known as food stamps,31 is one of the few 
major federal benefit programs that does not currently use the PRUCOL 
standard for determining eligibility.32 
By 1977, the Department of Labor administered the Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act (“FUTA”), the program that exacts a tax from employ-
ers to pay for unemployment insurance for employees who lose their jobs, 
with the same PRUCOL restrictions.33 The federal law required state re-
cipients of FUTA money to enact, among other provisions, identical 
PRUCOL restrictions in their equivalent state laws.34 
 
C. The First PRUCOL Cases: Holley v. Lavine and Berger v. Heckler 
It was only a matter of time before the PRUCOL benefit eligibility 
category, crafted with such vague language, would land in a federal court 
where the parties could contest—and for the first time define—what 
PRUCOL meant and to whom it referred. That time came in 1977, when 
the Second Circuit decided the seminal PRUCOL case of Holley v. Lavine 
and for the first time articulated a definition of PRUCOL.35 Holley was 
followed by Berger v. Heckler, which built substantially on Holley’s def-
inition.36 Together the two cases formed the PRUCOL doctrine and have 
been relied upon by dozens of courts37 in cases where the definition of 
who is and is not PRUCOL has continued to take shape. 
 
 30 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No 97-35, § 2320(a), 95 Stat. 
357; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B) (2018). 
 31 See, for example, the U.S. Census Bureau’s equivalent treatment of the two names in 
the agency’s FAQ section. Food Stamps/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/9KC5-BR27 (last visited May 17, 2020). 
 32 Robert Rubin, Walking a Gray Line: The “Color of Law” Test Governing Noncitizen 
Eligibility for Public Benefits, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 411, 420, 420 n.53 (1987). 
 33 For a discussion of the history of FUTA as a whole and how it pertains to the PRUCOL 
doctrine, see Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323, 324-26 (Ill. 1992); see also 26 U.S.C. 
§ 3304(a)(14)(A) (2018). 
 34 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (2018). For examples of state laws enacting PRUCOL re-
strictions in their unemployment insurance laws, see the Illinois Unemployment Insurance 
Act, § 614, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/614 (West 2020) (previous version at Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 444); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.085(12) (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4141.29(J) (West 2020). 
 35 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 36 Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1571 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 37 See infra Part III. 
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The Western District of New York was the first court to ask what 
PRUCOL meant before the case was appealed to the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Holley v. Lavine.38 Gayle McQuoid Holley was a Canadian 
national who entered the United States at the age of 12 in 1954 as a non-
immigrant student and practically resided in the United States ever 
since.39 Ms. Holley became a resident of Monroe County, New York, and 
eventually had six U.S. citizen children.40 Sometime on or before 1974, 
Ms. Holley began receiving AFDC for herself and her six children 
through the Monroe County Department of Social Services (“DSS”).41 In 
1974, however, New York State enacted now-repealed Social Services 
Law § 131-k-1, which said that every person “unlawfully residing in the 
United states . . . is not eligible for aid to dependent children.”42 In an ef-
fort to comply with § 131-k-1, the Monroe County DSS stopped paying 
AFDC to Ms. Holley herself, although they continued payments to her six 
children, as they were U.S. citizens.43 Ms. Holley sued the Monroe Coun-
try DSS and then-Commissioner of the New York State DSS Abe Lavine 
for her AFDC benefits.44 Ms. Holley argued that § 131-k-1 was 
preempted by the federal “color of law” standard, and that § 131-k-1 ran 
afoul of the federal Equal Protection Clause.45 The Western District of 
New York found that the New York law was not in conflict with the fed-
eral “color of law” standard.46 On appeal, the Second Circuit questioned 
that ruling.47 The Circuit’s decision turned on “the meaning of ‘perma-
nently residing in the United States under color of law.’”48 
The Second Circuit lamented that neither party could furnish legis-
lative intent behind the federal statute.49 New York argued that allowing 
persons like Ms. Holley to be in the United States unlawfully reflected a 
problem of “horrendous proportions,” alleging financial ruin if states 
were charged with supporting people like Ms. Holley financially.50 The 
 
 38 Holley, 553 F.2d at 847. 
 39 Id. at 848. She resided continuously in the United States since 1954 “except for three 
months in 1958,” although the opinion does not say why she left during that time. Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Holley, 553 F.2d at 848. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Incidentally, the first time Holley v. Lavine went before the Second Circuit it produced 
a much shorter opinion wherein the Second Circuit overturned the district court judge’s initial 
dismissal of these federal and constitutional claims. See Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d 1294, 
1295-96 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 46 Holley, 553 F.2d at 848. 
 47 Id. at 848-49. 
 48 Id. at 848 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 233.50(b) (1977)). 
 49 Id. at 849. 
 50 Id. 
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court’s response was that, although Ms. Holley did not have lawful immi-
gration status, she was in the country “not . . . without the knowledge or 
permission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.”51 The Second 
Circuit reasoned that Ms. Holley was in the United States with the gov-
ernment’s knowledge and permission because “a responsible official” of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)—whose functions 
were transferred to three new entities under the newly formed Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) in 2003—had notified New York State 
that “‘deportation proceedings have not been instituted . . . for humanitar-
ian reasons’ and the ‘Service does not contemplate enforcing her depar-
ture from the United States at this time.’”52 The court described some 
form of humanitarian deferred action, or special permission to defer her 
deportation, which Ms. Holley had been granted because she was the par-
ent to six U.S. citizen dependents.53 
After noting that Ms. Holley was present with the government’s 
knowledge and permission, the Second Circuit provided a thoughtful def-
inition of the phrase “color of law”: 
It embraces not only situations within the body of the law, but also 
others enfolded by a colorable imitation. “Under color of law” 
means that which an official does by virtue of power, as well as 
what he does by virtue of right. The phrase encircles the law, its 
shadows, and its penumbra. When an administrative agency or a 
legislative body uses the phrase “under color of law” it deliber-
ately sanctions the inclusion of cases that are, in strict terms, out-
side the law but are near the border.54 
The court concluded that “official assurance that [a] parent will not 
be deported” rendered that parent someone residing “under color of 
law.”55 Reasoning that the INS had the discretion to not enforce the law 
against persons it had reason to allow to remain, such an assurance was 
evidence that the agency was exercising that discretion.56 
 
 51 Holley, 553 F.2d at 849. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 850. The opinion notes that the letter from INS actually specified that, “[s]hould 
the dependency of the children change, her case would be reviewed for possible action con-
sistent with circumstances then existing,” showing that Ms. Holley was granted deferred ac-
tion at least in large part because she was caring for six U.S. citizen children. 
 54 Id. at 849-50. 
 55 Id. at 849. 
 56 Holley, 553 F.2d at 850. 
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The respondents argued that the word “permanent” in “permanently 
residing under color of law” meant exactly that: the status had to be con-
ceived of as one that would last indefinitely.57 But the Holley court disa-
greed, invoking the doctrine of statutory interpretation known as noscitur 
a sociis and divining the meaning of “permanently” by looking at other 
parts of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) to which the statute 
in question made reference.58 From this the court concluded that “[a] re-
lationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be dissolved 
eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individ-
ual.”59 The court found that even though the government explicitly said 
that Ms. Holley could lose her PRUCOL status if she no longer had de-
pendents, Ms. Holley’s status was still permanent as the INA defined the 
term.60 Today, as codified in federal law, the definition of “permanent” 
reflects the Holley court’s interpretation.61 
Ms. Holley was PRUCOL, the court held, and thus the INA 
preempted New York Social Services Law § 131-k-1 such that Ms. Hol-
ley remained eligible for AFDC.62 The district court’s opinion was re-
versed and remanded. As a result, New York was enjoined from enforcing 
§ 131-k-1 and ultimately ordered to pay Ms. Holley all overdue AFDC 
back payments.63 The U.S. Supreme Court denied New York’s petition 
for a writ of certiorari.64 
Holley laid the ground rules of PRUCOL. First, PRUCOL status is 
established when the non-citizen is in the United States with the govern-
ment’s knowledge and permission, and the government does not currently 
contemplate their deportation. Second, as described by the Holley court, 
“color of law” encompasses those cases that are, by definition, outside the 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 850-51. 
 59 Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (1974)). The court noted that an extension was 
“highly probable” because, given Ms. Holley’s attachments to the United States, in the court’s 
opinion, “no executive department [was] likely to require her to return to a land she [had] left.” 
Id. at 851. 
 60 Id. at 850. 
 61 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (2018) (“The term ‘permanent’ means a relationship of contin-
uing or lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent 
even though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United 
States or of the individual, in accordance with law.”). 
 62 Holley, 553 F.2d at 851. 
 63 Holley v. Lavine, 464 F. Supp. 718, 722 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). The 1979 district court 
opinion also held that the state of New York was not liable for damages to Ms. Holley. Id. at 
721-23. However, Ms. Holley appealed the decision on damages and the State filed a cross-
appeal on the other decisions against it, resulting in a final Second Circuit opinion that found 
for Ms. Holley on all claims, including damages. Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638 (2d. Cir. 
1979). 
 64 Russo v. Holley, 446 U.S. 913 (1980). 
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law. Lastly “permanently” does not mean permanent in a literal English 
sense, but rather as it is used elsewhere in the INA, to wit, a relationship 
that may be dissolved eventually. 
Even though Holley provided a definition of PRUCOL, the definition 
was nonetheless complex enough that its precise application remained 
opaque. If Holley was the first time we received a definition of PRUCOL, 
Berger v. Heckler was the first time we received examples of circum-
stances that fall into Holley’s definition. 
Manny Berger was a national of the Soviet Union who overstayed a 
visitor visa, surrendered to the INS in 1967, and was subsequently ordered 
deported.65 The INS was unable to obtain travel documents, however, and 
Mr. Berger was given an order of supervision (“OSUP”),66 a form of spe-
cial permission to remain in the United States under the “supervision” of 
immigration authorities.67 At some point in this process, Mr. Berger’s SSI 
benefits were cut off, prompting him to sue the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) in a class action.68 Mr. Berger argued his OSUP 
made him PRUCOL, and the district court case partially turned on this 
issue. 
In June 1978, Mr. Berger’s district court class action resulted in a 
consent decree which, inter alia, said that persons with OSUPs and per-
sons with pending visa petitions were PRUCOL.69 The initial consent de-
cree, in fact, listed some 22 different PRUCOL categories70 but was later 
amended to include 15 categories in total.71 HHS was eventually ordered 
to publish a list of 15 agreed-upon categories of PRUCOL non-citizens.72 
Codifying a list of PRUCOL categories was a natural way of giving clar-
ity to a stubbornly vague definition, and the strategy of better defining 
PRUCOL through a list of categories has been used by many statutes and 
state public assistance administrations ever since.73 This article proposes 
a taxonomy of its own in Part III. 
 
 65 Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1559 (2d. Cir. 1985). 
 66 Id. 
 67 See 8 C.F.R § 241.5(a) (2020). 
 68 Berger, 771 F.2d at 1559. Emma Mena, an SSI recipient and cancer survivor, moved 
to intervene in Mr. Berger’s case after her SSI was terminated because HHS did not think that 
her pending application for an immediate relative visa petition made her PRUCOL. Id. 
 69 Id. at 1559-60. 
 70 Id. at 1560. 
 71 Id. at 1576 n.33. 
 72 Id. at 1560. 
 73 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3 (2020); 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS. 
§ 1822(g)(30)(A)(6) (1997); 130 MASS. CODE. REGS. 504.003(C) (2020); N.M. CODE R. 
§ 8.106.100.7(B)(16) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-
3.2(j)(1)(ii) (2020). 
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The consent decree parties also agreed to a definition of PRUCOL 
that, though the Berger court does not explicit say so, echoes Holley: 
Any other alien residing in the United States with the knowledge 
and permission of the INS and whose departure from the United 
States the [INS] does not contemplate enforcing is also perma-
nently residing in the United States under color of law and may 
be eligible for SSI benefits.74 
The court added: “[W]e find that the phrase, ‘under color of law,’ is 
designed to be an open vessel—to be given substance by experience.”75 
Berger thus reaffirmed Holley’s core principal of PRUCOL, to wit, that 
the phrase “encircles the law, its shadows, and its penumbra” is not meant 
to be applied rigidly and should, by definition, include those who are out-
side the law.76 
The definitions, guidance, and list-strategy laid out in Holley and 
Berger have been relied upon by courts in nearly every jurisdiction where 
PRUCOL has come before a court or administrative tribunal.77 After Hol-
ley and Berger, more federal district and appellate courts, as well as state 
courts, have applied the PRUCOL definition to a variety of immigration 
circumstances of applicants who have been denied access to Medicaid, 
SSI, AFDC, and FUTA entitlement programs. In each of these instances, 
courts have decided whether an applicant’s immigration circumstance, 
which was neither obviously lawful nor obviously unlawful, conferred 
PRUCOL eligibility for the entitlement program. All such cases are dis-
cussed infra in Part III, where they are organized by the applicant’s im-
migration circumstances. 
 
D. PRWORA and the End of the PRUCOL Doctrine at the Federal 
Level 
By 1985, the PRUCOL category of benefit eligibility, now given a 
working definition by the Second Circuit in Holley and Berger, could be 
found in four different federal public benefit programs: SSI, Medicaid, 
AFDC, and FUTA. This would remain the status quo until 1996. 
That year, Congress passed the infamous Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which effectively 
 
 74 Berger, 771 F.2d at 1560 (alterations omitted). 
 75 Id. at 1574. 
 76 Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 77 See infra Part III. 
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gutted many public assistance programs78 and “end[ed] welfare as we 
know it.”79 Just one of the many ways it cut off millions from federal 
assistance was by mostly abolishing the PRUCOL doctrine at the federal 
level.80 Under PRWORA, the SSI, Medicaid, and AFDC entitlement pro-
grams would be limited to what are now termed “qualified aliens,” a much 
smaller pool of non-citizens that consists only of lawful permanent resi-
dents (green card holders), asylees, refugees, some parolees, and a few 
other categories that together compose a smaller number of immigrants.81 
If a PRUCOL individual had been receiving SSI prior to August 22, 1996, 
the date PRWORA went into effect, they could continue to receive it 
thereafter.82 
 
 78 Katherine Anne Paddock Betcher, Revisiting the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act and Calling for Equality: Problematic Moral Regulations and 
the Changing Legal Status of LGBT Families in a New Obama Administration, 31 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 104, 104-05 (2009). 
 79 Id. at 104 (quoting Chris Black, Clinton Says He’ll Sign Welfare Bill President Sees 
‘Step Forward’, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1996, at A1). By changing AFDC into the TANF 
program, PRWORA subjected qualifying families to greater qualification requirements, lim-
ited the availability of benefits to a maximum of five years, and required recipients to partici-
pate in work activities after receiving benefits for two years. 
 80 In the opinion of at least one commentator, that legislation abolished the PRUCOL 
doctrine. Michael J. Sheridan, The New Affidavit of Support and Other 1996 Amendments to 
Immigration and Welfare Provisions Designed to Prevent Aliens from Becoming Public 
Charges, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 741, 745-51 (1998). 
 81 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2018). Other categories include Cuban and Haitian entrants. Id. 
§ 1641(b)(7). 
 82 8 U.S.C § 1612(a)(2)(E) (2018); see also Forcelledo v. Colvi, No. 3:15-cv-00824-AA, 
2016 WL 1718193, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 29, 2016) (“[T]he ‘permanently residing under color of 
law’ standard no longer generally applies to aliens applying for SSI.”). 
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However, PRWORA did not affect FUTA, and the PRUCOL doc-
trine appears to have lived on at the federal and state levels per that legis-
lation.83 The federal FUTA eligibility requirement for non-citizens re-
mains PRUCOL,84 and every state,85 the District of Columbia,86 and the 
Virgin Islands87 has a statute that allows PRUCOL individuals to access 
unemployment insurance under the local FUTA scheme. However, in 
practice, some states seem to define PRUCOL eligibility in this context 
as being “available to work,” that is, in possession of valid work authori-
zation.88 
 
 83 See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2018); Megrabian v. Saenz, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 265 (Ct. 
App. 2005). 
 84 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (2020). 
 85 ALA. CODE § 25-4-78(14)(a)(2) (2020); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.20.281(b) (2020); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-781(B) (2020); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-10-511(a) (West 2020); 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 1264-1(a)(1), (3) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-
107(7)(a)(III) (West 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-227(f)(A) (West 2020); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 19, § 3314(10)(a) (West 2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.101(7) (West 2020); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 34-8-196(d)(1) (West 2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383-29(d) (West 2020); 
IDAHO ADMIN CODE r. 09.01.30.125(01) (2019); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/614(b) (West 
2020); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, § 2905.1 (2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-14-9(b) (West 
2020); IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.5(10) (West 2020); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 871-24.60(96) (2020); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(m) (West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.360(3)(a) (West 
2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1600(6)(c)(I) (2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1192(11) 
(2019); 10-144-103 ME. CODE R. § 2.2-5 (LexisNexis 2020); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. 
§ 8-905(a)(3) (West 2020); 151A MASS. CODE REGS. 25(h) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 421.27(k)(1) (West 2020); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.085(12)(b)(3) (West 2020); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 71-5-511(j)(i) (West 2020); MO. ANN. STAT. § 288.040(8) (West 2020); MONT. CODE 
ANN.§ 39-51-2110(1) (West 2020); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-628.04(1)(c) (West 2020); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 612.448(1)(c) (West 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:41(I), (II) 
(2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-4(i)(1) (West 2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-5(A), (F) (West 
2020); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 590(9) (McKinney 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-13(f)(1) (2020); 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 52-06-02(14) (West 2020); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4141.29(J) (2020); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2-208(1) (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657.184 (West 
2020); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 802.3(a) (West 2020); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 28-44-67(a) (West 2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-67(1) (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 61-
6-34 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-302(b)(4) (West 2020); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 
§ 207.043(a)(3) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-405(10)(a) (West 2020); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 1343(f)(1) (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-617(A) (West 2020); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 50.20.098(1) (West 2020); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-6-3(8)(a) (West 
2020); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(18)(a) (West 2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-309(a) (West 
2020). 
 86 D.C. Code Ann. § 51-109(a)(9)(A) (West 2020). 
 87 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 12-304(a)(7)(A) (2020). 
 88 See, e.g., Matter of Diamond (HUDACS), 210 A.D.2d 835, 835-36 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1994) (noting that N.Y. Labor Law 527(1)(a) disqualifies claimants from employment insur-
ance if they are not “available for work,” and looking to federal FUTA to define that as being 
in possession of valid work authorization). See also infra Section III.A.1 for other contexts in 
which PRUCOL status is limited to possession of valid work authorization. 
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In the wake of PRWORA and PRUCOL’s federal demise for SSI, 
Medicaid, and AFDC (TANF after 1996), states were faced with a choice 
regarding citizenship eligibility for state-funded benefits. Under 
PRWORA, states could end the use of PRUCOL eligibility as the federal 
government had, or they could continue to provide state-funded benefits 
to PRUCOL individuals. To do so, they would need to pass a new law 
after PRWORA’s effective date of August 22, 1996.89 Some states did 
that.90 Other states either abolished the PRUCOL doctrine or never up-
dated their PRUCOL statutes or regulations, thereby allowing PRUCOL 
in their state to become preempted by PRWORA.91 
At least seven states, including New York, have retained PRUCOL 
eligibility for state-funded Medicaid or Medicaid-like public health insur-
ance schemes.92 Virginia has retained PRUCOL eligibility for its HIV 
Premium Assistance program,93 and Maryland has retained the doctrine 
 
 89 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2018). 
 90 See Megrabian v. Saenz, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 265-67 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing 
California’s legislative efforts to retain PRUCOL eligibility for certain public benefits). 
 91 See e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3) (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 126-515(B), 126-
360(A), 114-1510(B)(3) (2020); S.D. ADMIN R. 67:12:01:14 (2020). New Jersey, for example, 
basically stayed in lockstep with the federal law. See Guaman v. Velez, 23 A.3d 451 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (discussing the comprehensive history of New Jersey Medicaid 
eligibility since PROWRA). Florida has also dropped its PRUCOL eligibility. See FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 443.101(7) (West 2020). 
 92 The states are California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and 
Virginia. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14007.5(b) (West 2020); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, 
§§ 50301(b)(4), 50301.6 (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-257b(a) (West 2020); HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-59.4(2) (West 2020); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, §§ 118.500(a)(2), 
120.310(b), 240.750 (2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, §§ 9, 16D(2), 47A (West 
2020); 130 MASS. CODE REGS. §§ 504.003(B)-(C), 505.004, 505.005(A)(1)-(5), 518.003(B)-
(C), 519.013(A) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 366(g)(1), 369-gg(8) (McKin-
ney 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 360-3.2(j)(ii), 360-3.6(a)(2) (2020); 12 
VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 30-10-170, 30-40-10 (2020). 
 93 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-100-260(1)(b) (2020). 
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for its Kidney Disease Program.94 At least ten states95 and the U.S. terri-
tory of Guam96 have retained PRUCOL eligibility for means-tested, disa-
bility-based, or elderly-based cash assistance programs. Only a few states 
appear to refer to PRUCOL with respect to nutrition assistance programs; 
Florida has retained the PRUCOL definition to determine eligibility for 
its School and Nutrition Services,97 while New Jersey,98 Maine,99 and Ar-
kansas100 say explicitly that PRUCOL individuals are not eligible for their 
state SNAP programs. Still other states have retained the doctrine for mis-
cellaneous state benefits. One such state is Washington,101 which retained 
the doctrine to determine eligibility for in-state college tuition at public 
universities. 
New York was the only state in which the legislature abolished the 
PRUCOL doctrine for state-funded Medicaid by passing Social Services 
Law § 122, but that legislative act was overturned by the New York Court 
of Appeals in 2001 on state constitutional grounds, restoring PRUCOL 
eligibility to New York’s Medicaid program.102 In Aliessa v. Novello, the 
Court of Appeals held that Social Services Law § 122 was incompatible 
with Article XVII of the New York State Constitution, which obliges the 
state to provide assistance to the “needy.”103 The Aliessa court found that 
it was constitutionally impermissible to condition Medicaid eligibility on 
any criteria other than need, such as “alienage” restrictions.104 In effect, 
the Aliessa court said that the state must provide the same benefit to 
PRUCOL individuals as it does to U.S. citizen state residents.105 The 
 
 94 MD. CODE REGS. 10.30.01.09(B) (2020). 
 95 These states are Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17b-
112c(a), 17b-342(a) (West 2020); MD. CODE REGS. 07.03.03.07(1)(b) (2020); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 117A, § 4 (2020); 106 MASS. CODE REGS. § 703.440(A)(3) (2020); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 8.106.100, 8.102.410 (2020); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 122(1)(c), 158(1)(g) (McKin-
ney 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 349.3(b)(1)(iv), 370.2(c)(6)(vii), 403.7(c) 
(2020); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 71P.0902(a)(2) (2020); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-6-3, 40-6-
3.1(a), 40-6-27.1(b) (West 2020); 218 R.I. ADMIN. CODE 20-00-3.16.2 (LexisNexis 2020); 
TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1240-01-03-.08(2)(b), 1240-01-03-.12(2)(b)(1)(ii), 1240-01-47-
.06(1)(b) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 74.04.805(1)(b), 74.62.030(3)(a) (2020). 
 96 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 1822(g)(30)(A)(6) (1997). 
 97 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 595.408(1)(b) (West 2020). 
 98 N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:87–3.9(a)(2) (2020). 
 99 10-144-301 ME. CODE R. § FS-111-2 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 100 16-20-03 ARK. CODE R. § 162 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 101 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 28B.15.012(4)(b)(vi) (West 2020); see also the corresponding 
state regulation, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-18-020(2)(b)(i) (2020). 
 102 Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 429 (2001). 
 103 Id. at 428-29. 
 104 Id. at 436. 
 105 Id. 
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PRUCOL doctrine was thus restored to state Medicaid eligibility.106 
Meanwhile, New York had actually continued to use PRUCOL eligibility 
for a state-specific cash assistance program called Safety Net Assistance 
(“SNA”) in part of the same 1997 law that was enacted in response to 
PWRORA.107 
Today, state-funded Medicaid and SNA in New York continue to 
retain their PRUCOL restrictions.108 However, because no statewide con-
sensus on the definition of PRUCOL has ever emerged, various state 
agencies define the term differently. The State Department of Health 
(“DOH”), which administers the state’s Medicaid program, provides a 
lengthy list of immigration circumstances that it contends confer 
PRUCOL eligibility, in an approach reminiscent of the Berger consent 
decree’s list of PRUCOL categories.109 The state’s welfare administrative 
body, the Office of Temporary Disability Assistance (“OTDA”), which 
administers the SNA program, also provides a list of immigration circum-
stances that it sees as conferring PRUCOL eligibility, but this list is sub-
stantially shorter than the DOH’s.110 This disparity in PRUCOL defini-
tions produces an unbalanced status quo in which many non-citizens 
qualify for Medicaid but not SNA: one state agency views them as 
PRUCOL, while the other does not. 
 
 106 See, e.g., Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Daines, No. 019223/09, 2010 WL 623707, at 
*2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2010). 
 107 See Tonashka v. Weinberg, 678 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (Sup. Ct. 1998). 
 108 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 122(1)(c), 158(1)(g), 366(g) (McKinney 2020); see also 
MKB v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“PRUCOL aliens, although 
ineligible for many federal benefits, may nonetheless qualify in New York for state-funded 
Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 109 The New York State Department of Health has issued multiple guidance documents 
and letters setting PRUCOL guidelines: ADM-7 and ADM-8, both issued in 2004, were more 
generous, but INF-2 and INF-4, respectively issued in 2007 and 2008, were stricter and are 
discussed in some detail in Brunswick, 2010 WL 623707, at *2. See N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
INF-4, CLARIFICATION OF PRUCOL STATUS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY (2008), 
https://perma.cc/PDE4-MKR8; N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, INF-2, CLARIFICATION OF PRUCOL 
STATUS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY 2-3 (2007), https://perma.cc/HQQ3-MPKQ; 
N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ADM-8, ALIESSA/ADAMOLEKUN V. NOVELLO IMPLEMENTATION OF 
RETROACTIVE RELIEF TO CLASS MEMBERS (2004), https://perma.cc/VKN6-T6LQ; N.Y. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH, ADM-7, CITIZENSHIP AND ALIEN STATUS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MEDICAID 
PROGRAM 19-20 (2004), https://perma.cc/L8CH-F6DE. 
 110 N.Y. OFFICE OF TEMP. & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, LDSS-4579, NON-CITIZEN 
ELIGIBILITY DESK AID 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/JZ7F-UMGB; cf. N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR HEALTH COVERAGE IN NEW YORK STATE 9-10 
(2008), https://perma.cc/CTD4-AVTX. How DOH’s list and the ODTA’s list differ is ad-
dressed infra in Part III, where relevant. See also EMPIRE JUSTICE CTR., PUBLIC CHARGE AND 
IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC BENEFITS 2-6 (2020), https://perma.cc/4JDF-HRTW. 
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II. EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP ON THE PRUCOL DOCTRINE 
Only a handful of scholarly articles and discussions have focused 
substantially on the PRUCOL doctrine. These include Professor Sharon 
Carton’s 1990 article The PRUCOL Proviso in Public Benefits Law: Alien 
Eligibility for Public Benefits111 and Robert Rubin’s 1987 Walking a Gray 
Line: The “Color of Law” Test Governing Noncitizen Eligibility for Pub-
lic Benefits.112 While not focusing entirely on the PRUCOL doctrine, a 
few other authors have provided substantial analysis of its statutory ori-
gins and judicial construction in the context of different topics.113 A few 
other authors, in mentioning the doctrine, have briefly discussed the Hol-
ley decision without addressing its progeny.114 Otherwise, most refer-
ences to the doctrine are cursory mentions beyond the scope of the dis-
cussions in which it is cited,115 or else the doctrine is literally a footnote.116 
The doctrine also has its share of brief references in immigration and 
health publications.117 
 
 111 See Sharon F. Carton, The PRUCOL Proviso in Public Benefits Law: Alien Eligibility 
for Public Benefits, 14 NOVA L. REV. 1033 (1990). 
 112 Rubin, supra note 32. 
 113 Calvo, supra note 21, at 411-17; Irene Scharf, Preemption by Fiat: The Department of 
Labor’s Usurpation of Power over Noncitizen Workers’ Rights to Unemployment Benefits, 56 
ALB. L. REV. 561, 562-67 (1993) (discussing PRUCOL in the context of non-citizens’ unem-
ployment insurance eligibility); Sara N. Kominers, Caught in the Gap Between Status and No-
Status: Lawful Presence Then and Now, 17 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 57, 58 (2016). 
 114 See, e.g., Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, California’s Proposition 187—Does It Mean What 
It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual and Constitutional Analysis, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 577, 598-99 (1996); Nabilah Irshad, Medical Repatriations: Death Sentencing United 
States Immigrants, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 797, 802-03 (2012). 
 115 See, e.g., Fatma Marouf, Alienage Classifications and the Denial of Health Care to 
Dreamers, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1271, 1319 (2016); Anna C. Tavis, Healthcare for All: En-
suring States Comply with the Equal Protection Rights of Legal Immigrants, 51 B.C. L. REV. 
1627, 1637 (2010). 
 116 See, e.g., Gregory T. W. Rosenberg, Alienating Aliens: Equal Protection Violations in 
the Structures of State Public-Benefit Schemes, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417, 1424 n.37 (2014); 
Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregard for International Law in the World 
War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians – A Case Study, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275, 323 
n.247 (1998). 
 117 See, e.g., Teresa L. Beck et al., Medical Care for Undocumented Immigrants: National 
and International Issues, 44 PRIMARY CARE, at e1, e9 (2017); Marilyn R. Ellwood & Leighton 
Ku, Welfare and Immigration Reforms: Unintended Side Effects for Medicaid, 17 HEALTH 
AFF. 137, 145-46 (1998); Bill Frelick & Barbara Kohnen, Filling the Gap: Temporary Pro-
tected Status, 8 J. REFUGEE STUD. 339, 352 (1995); Charles Wheeler & Robert Leventhal, Al-
iens’ Rights to Public Benefits, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 913, 914, 916-17 (1986); MAYSOUN 
FREIJ ET AL., N.Y. IMMIGRATION COAL., “MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY”: A STUDY OF UNINSURED 
IMMIGRANTS’ PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH INSURANCE IN NEW YORK CITY 5 (2010); Marvi S. 
Lacar, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996: Impli-
cations for Hispanic Migrant Farmworkers 3 (Julian Samora Research Inst., Working Paper 
No. 53, 2001). 
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III. APPLYING PRUCOL: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE AND TAXONOMY 
Advising clients on whether or not they are PRUCOL for purposes 
of accessing their eligibility for public benefits can be challenging when 
their immigration status is ambiguous because the doctrine was deliber-
ately designed to be vague and malleable. In the practice of immigration 
law there are an endless variety of circumstances that either do not fit 
neatly into those mentioned in a Berger-type list or otherwise raise ques-
tions about whether they fall under the Holley definition. It is precisely 
such circumstances that have given rise to the available case law. 
The PRUCOL categories described below are solely the authors’ 
designations and in no way reflect a designation articulated anywhere in 
the law. The categories are invented here only to provide a convenient 
index system for practitioners and a navigable taxonomy of immigration 
circumstances and their corollary PRUCOL category. 
One more thing to consider when reviewing the PRUCOL taxonomy 
guide for practitioners: even though the federal PRUCOL doctrine was 
largely abolished in 1996, several states have continued to use the doc-
trine to determine non-citizen eligibility for various state-funded benefits. 
When they did so, courts in these states continued to rely upon pre-1996 
federal case law that interpreted PRUCOL, starting with Holley and Ber-
ger, but including later federal cases discussed below as well.118 As such, 
pre-PRWORA federal PRUCOL case law remains good law today in 
those jurisdictions that employ a state-PRUCOL designation, and so they 
are included where applicable below. 
A. Category One: Approved Applications 
There are many forms of immigration relief that can be applied for 
but that, if approved, do not confer “qualified alien” benefit eligibility 
status.119 These include approved applications for Temporary Protected 
Status (TPS), U and S non-immigrant visas, parole for less than one year, 
some valid work authorizations, and certain prosecutorial discretionary 
relief, such as deferred action. Generally, where individuals with such sta-
tuses have applied for and been granted some form of relief in immigra-
tion law, the courts are most likely to find that they are PRUCOL. 
 
 118 See, e.g., Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Daines, No. 019223/09, 2010 WL 623707 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2010) (relying on Holley and Berger); Tonashka v. Weinberg, 678 N.Y.S.2d 
883, 884-85 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (relying on the pre-PRWORA progeny of Holley and Berger). 
 119 Velasquez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 581 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984); see also Smart v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 921, 923 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that PRUCOL status 
is not the equivalent of being lawfully admitted for permanent residence). 
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1. Approved Employment Authorization Documents 
Perhaps the most common approved application that courts regard as 
conferring PRUCOL status is the approved work permit, or Employment 
Authorization Document (“EAD”).120 
Mr. Jose N. Vazquez, a national of Argentina, had a valid work per-
mit, which he received because of a pending asylum application.121 Mr. 
Vazquez applied for and was denied unemployment benefits based on his 
alleged lack of PRUCOL eligibility during the time he had the valid work 
permit, so he sued the Indiana Board of Employment.122 The reviewing 
state court noted that while Mr. Vazquez lacked explicit permission to 
remain in the United States, unlike the Holley claimant, courts in five 
other states had relied on a valid work permit as grounds for finding some-
one PRUCOL.123 Finding this consensus persuasive, the Vazquez court 
found Mr. Vazquez PRUCOL “until and unless this [work] authorization 
is terminated by the denial of Vazquez’s petition for asylum and/or legal 
proceedings of deportation.”124 
In Alfred v. Florida Department of Labor, 26 Haitian nationals were 
found PRUCOL during the period in which they had valid work per-
mits.125 The court found them PRUCOL and eligible for unemployment 
benefits under FUTA because the government had given no indication 
that their deportation was planned or being pursued,126 even though the 
state of Florida had argued that the Haitian nationals were not PRUCOL 
because they had not been given an affirmative written statement that the 
government did not intend to deport them. The Alfred court disagreed, 
identifying their work permits as enough proof that deportation was not 
currently the government’s intention.127 
The Superior Court of New Jersey has also endorsed the contention, 
in an unpublished opinion, that a valid work permit makes one 
PRUCOL.128 The Superior Court explained that Zbigniew Cieslewicz, a 
national of Poland, would have been PRUCOL during the time he worked, 
 
 120 E.g., Castillo v. Jackson, 566 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 121 Vazquez v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 487 N.E.2d 171, 171-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1985). 
 122 Id. at 172. 
 123 Id. at 174-75. 
 124 Id. at 175. 
 125 Alfred v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 487 So. 2d 355, 356-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 126 Id. at 357-58. 
 127 Id. at 358. 
 128 Cieslewicz v. Bd. of Review, No. 161,531, 2009 WL 804400, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Mar. 30, 2009). 
384 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:364 
and thus was eligible to receive unemployment benefits, if he had a valid 
work permit during his period of employment.129 
A number of Colorado state court decisions have also found that in-
dividuals in possession of valid work permits procured during pending 
applications to adjust status were PRUCOL.130 One Colorado state court 
found Mustapha Yatribi was PRUCOL for purposes of FUTA eligibility: 
Mr. Yatribi had a pending application for adjustment of status, but the 
court seemed to rely more on the valid work permit granted to him while 
his application was pending as the primary factor conferring PRUCOL 
eligibility.131 
2. Grants of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutorial discretion refers to an instance in which the immigra-
tion authority “refrain[s] from asserting the full scope of the agency’s en-
forcement authority in a particular case.”132 The most conspicuous exer-
cises of this discretion include stays or deferrals of deportation by U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement for individuals who otherwise 
have no status or defense from deportation. It also includes permission to 
enter the United States via the issuance of parole by U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection for individuals who otherwise have no means of lawful 
entry into the country.133 
Post-deportation order  grants of prosecutorial discretion, such as 
stays of deportation, suspension of deportation, and deferred action 
(which refers to the deferral of deportation) are widely recognized as con-
ferring PRUCOL eligibility. Voluntary departure is a form of discretion-
ary relief in which no order of deportation is issued, but the individual is 
required to leave “voluntarily” by a certain date.134 The federal regulation 
listing PRUCOL categories135 includes stays of deportation and voluntary 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 See, e.g., Indus. Comm’n v. Arteaga, 735 P.2d 473, 482 (Colo. 1987); Yatribi v. Indus. 
Comm’n of Colo., 700 P.2d 929, 931 (Colo. App. 1985); Zanjani v. Indus. Comm’n, 703 P.2d 
652, 653-54 (Colo. App. 1985). 
 131 Yatribi, 700 P.2d at 931 (“[P]etitioner was eligible for unemployment compensation 
benefits when he received work authorization from the INS.”). 
 132 WADHIA, supra note 18, at 7. 
 133 Id. at 11. 
 134 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2018). 
 135 While the federal PRUCOL regulation is no longer in use after welfare reform and 
PRWORA, we are referencing it here to provide some context. 
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departure, both general136 and indefinite,137 as well as suspension of de-
portation138 and deferred action.139 California’s Medi-Cal program lists 
post-deportation order grants of prosecutorial discretion, including indef-
inite and extended voluntary departure, as conferring PRUCOL status.140 
The same goes for New Mexico’s state Medicaid regulations,141 Pennsyl-
vania’s public assistance PRUCOL definitions (now preempted by 
PRWORA),142 and the territory of Guam’s public assistance regulation.143 
New York’s DOH likewise lists all of these grants of discretion among its 
list of PRUCOL statuses,144 and both New York’s OTDA and DOH agree 
that deferred action confers PRUCOL status.145 Massachusetts’s 
PRUCOL definition lists the same,146 with the exception that instead of 
listing deferred action generally, it is the only regulation that explicitly 
includes Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).147 Rhode Is-
land’s public assistance program once listed general and extended volun-
tary departure and stays of deportation, before it was repealed in 2018,148 
while Colorado’s149 and Iowa’s150 definitions of PRUCOLfor purposes of 
unemployment insurence currently list only deferred action generally as 
a PRUCOL category. 
Not surprisingly, the amended Berger consent decree listed stays of 
deportation, suspension of deportation, deferred action, and voluntary de-
parture among its PRUCOL categories.151 Other than Holley, in which the 
plaintiff certainly had deferred action (although it was not called that by 
 
 136 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(7) (2020) (stay of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a); id. at 
§ 416.1618(b)(10) (voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)). 
 137 Id. § 416.1618(b)(3) (indefinite stay of deportation); id. at § 416.1618(b)(4) (indefinite 
voluntary departure). 
 138 Id. § 416.1618(b)(14). 
 139 Id. § 416.1618(b)(11). 
 140 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3(d), (e), (h), (l), (n), (q) (2020). 
 141 N.M. CODE R. §§ 8.106.100.7(B)(16)(a), (b)(iv), (b)(x)-(xi), (b)(xiv), (b)(xvi), 
8.200.410.11 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 142 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3)(iii)-(iv), (vii), (x)-(xi), (xiv), (xvi) (2020). 
 143 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(vi)-(x) (1997). However, Guam’s 
regulation adds voluntary departure grants of “not less than one year.” Id. 
§ 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(viii). 
 144 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(c)-(d), (g)-(h), (k) (2020). 
 145 Id. § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(i); see also N.Y. OFFICE OF TEMP. & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, su-
pra note 110, at 1, 7. 
 146 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 504.003(C) (LexisNexis 2020). 
 147 Id. at 504.003(A)(3)(c)(6), (C)(1)-(2), (4), (7). 
 148 39-2 R.I. CODE R. § 0104 (LexisNexis 2020) (repealed 2018). 
 149 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-107(7)(a)(III)(E) (West 2020). 
 150 IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 871-24.60(96)(3)(b)(6) (2020). 
 151 Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 n.33 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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name),152 no other case law opines directly on whether or not these pros-
ecutorial discretion statuses in particular are PRUCOL. The question is so 
little posed probably because of the very common acceptance of their 
PRUCOL eligibility in state regulations and Holley. Prosecutorial discre-
tion is the most traditional and widely accepted form of PRUCOL status. 
While an individual with a grant of parole that exceeds one year be-
came a “qualified alien” after PRWORA,153 there is wide acceptance 
among jurisdictions that parole of any shorter duration continues to confer 
PRUCOL designation. The federal regulation that once provided the 
PRUCOL list for purposes of SSI—published as a result of the Berger 
consent decree—explicitly lists “temporary parole status” as establishing 
PRUCOL status.154 Most states spell out explicitly in their state-FUTA 
PRUCOL eligibility statutes or regulations that the definition of 
PRUCOL includes those non-citizens “lawfully present in the United 
States as a result of the application of the provisions of § 212(d)(5) of the 
INA,”155 which describes parole. New York State’s Medicaid regulations 
state that persons paroled into the United States for less than one year are 
PRUCOL.156 California’s Medi-Cal program regulation, Rhode Island’s 
former public assistance regulation, Tennessee’s cash assistance regula-
tion, Guam’s public assistance regulation, and one Iowa social services 
statute also explicitly list parolees under INA § 212 as PRUCOL.157 Sim-
ilarly, many of the pre-PRWORA regulations also list conditional en-
trants, a form of parole, as PRUCOL,158 even though conditional entrants 
became qualified aliens after PRWORA.159 
 
 152 The plaintiff in Holley was “covered by a letter from the Department of Justice stating 
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ‘does not contemplate enforcing . . . [her] . . . 
departure from the United States at this time,’” which was effectively a grant of deferred ac-
tion. Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 153 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(4) (2018). 
 154 45 C.F.R. § 233.50(b)(4) (2020). 
 155 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-511(a) (West 2020); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE 
§ 1264(a)(1) (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3314(10) (West 2020); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 96.5(10) (West 2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1600(6)(c)(I) (2019); 10-144-103 ME. CODE R. 
§ 2.2-5 (LexisNexis 2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 657.184 (2020). 
 156 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(a) (2020). 
 157 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3(b) (2020) (“INS Form I-94, with notation that the 
alien has been paroled into the United States pursuant to INA section 212(d)(5)”); 26 GUAM 
ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(iii) (1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.5(10) (West 2020); 
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 871-24.60(96)(3)(b)(3) (2020); 39-2 R.I. CODE R. § 0104 (repealed 
2018); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1240-1-3-.12(2)(b)(1)(ii)(IV) (2020). 
 158 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(1)-(2) (2020); 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS. 
§ 1822(g)(30)(A)(i) (1997); N.M. CODE R. § 8.200.410.11 (2020); 39-2 R.I. CODE R. § 0104, 
0104.05 (repealed 2018); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1240-1-3-.12(2)(b)(ii)(II) (2020); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. 28B.15.012(4)(b) (West 2020). 
 159 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(6)-(7) (2018). 
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At least two state courts concur that conditional entrants and parolees 
are PRUCOL. One Florida court has designated those granted the same 
under sections 203(a)(7) and 212(d)(5) of the INA as PRUCOL.160 In a 
Minnesota case, Flores v. Department of Jobs and Training, the Depart-
ment of Jobs and Training conceded that Juana Flores was PRUCOL 
when she had been paroled into the United States but had not been given 
authorization to work.161 The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the 
lower court’s decision and noted that the Department of Jobs and Training 
went so far as to concede that Ms. Flores was PRUCOL, even after her 
parole had expired, because INS took no steps to deport her months after 
its expiration.162 
3.  “Temporary” Status 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed in 
1986. The Act allowed certain non-citizens present in the United States 
since 1982 to apply for “temporary resident status.”163 Section 201(h)(1) 
of IRCA, however, explicitly precluded recipients of temporary resident 
status from being considered PRUCOL for purposes of Medicaid, food 
stamps, and any other means-tested state or federal benefits.164 This was 
despite the federal regulation that lists temporary resident status as a 
PRUCOL category.165 Reading this regulation together with the statute 
excluding means-tested benefits from PRUCOL eligibility implied that 
temporary permanent residents were nonetheless eligible for unemploy-
ment insurance, which is not means-tested. Only one state court has ad-
dressed whether temporary residents are PRUCOL for FUTA purposes. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois considered this question in Castillo v. 
Jackson in 1992.166 Two FUTA applicants, Victorino Castillo and Alberto 
Jimenez, argued that they were PRUCOL because unemployment insur-
ance under FUTA was not Medicaid, food stamps, or otherwise means-
tested, and thus an exception to IRCA’s section 201(h)(1).167 The Castillo 
court appeared to agree with the appellants and proceeded to determine 
whether or not they were PRUCOL.168 Relying on Holley’s definition of 
 
 160 Alfred v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 487 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 161 Flores v. Dep’t of Jobs & Training, 393 N.W.2d 231, 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 162 Flores v. Dep’t of Jobs & Training, 411 N.W.2d 499, 501, 504 (Minn. 1987). 
 163 Ortega de Robles v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 58 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 164 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h)(1) (2018). 
 165 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(16) (2020). 
 166 Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323 (Ill. 1992). 
 167 Id. at 329. 
 168 Id. at 329-30. 
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“permanent,” the Illinois Supreme Court said that temporary residence 
status was a “permanent” status despite its contrary-sounding name be-
cause the permanence of one’s status is determined “by the nature and not 
simply the title of [one’s] immigration status.”169 Despite its name, tem-
porary residence can be conferred on someone with no intention of re-
turning to their country of origin and has no defined end to its duration.170 
The Court noted that the appellants in the case had continuously resided 
in the United States for years, paid taxes, held long-term jobs, and had no 
principal dwelling place “anywhere but this country.”171 The Court thus 
held that they were in the United States “permanently” under Holley’s 
interpretation of that term.172 Again looking to Holley, the Court also 
agreed that they were residing “under color of law” because their statuses 
placed them in “a class of aliens covered by an INS policy or statutory 
mandate not to deport.”173 
A Wisconsin state court, on the other hand, dodged the question of 
whether or not a beneficiary of temporary resident status under IRCA was 
PRUCOL.174 Frederick N. Pickering was a national of Jamaica who was 
granted temporary resident status and work authorization under IRCA.175 
Before he was granted temporary residency, however, Mr. Pickering lost 
his job, applied for unemployment insurance, and received it. The Depart-
ment of Industry, Labor and Human Relations later decided that he re-
ceived it improperly.176 FUTA required that an applicant be PRUCOL 
during the period of work in question, and as Mr. Pickering’s alleged 
PRUCOL status began after his work ended, the Wisconsin court upheld 
the lower court’s decision, finding PRUCOL status could not apply retro-
actively.177 But the court did so without ever addressing whether or not 
IRCA relief made Mr. Pickering PRUCOL.178 
 
 169 Id. at 332 (citing Castillo v. Jackson, 566 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)). 
 170 Id. at 331. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Castillo, 594 N.E.2d at 332. 
 173 Id. at 333. 
 174 Pickering v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 456 N.W.2d 874 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
 175 Id. at 875, 877 (noting that “courts ruling that PRUCOL status was conferred by INS 
action or policy have held that such status was attained when INS knew of and acquiesced to 
an alien’s presence and not before” and citing to decisions from Colorado, Florida, and Indi-
ana). 
 176 Id. at 875. 
 177 Id. at 877-78. 
 178 Id. 
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Generally, temporary residence status under IRCA does not appear 
on any state’s list of PRUCOL categories.179 Only Guam’s public assis-
tance regulation lists temporary resident status holders as PRUCOL, and 
then only if they are also conditional entrants, have also adjusted to lawful 
permanent resident (“LPR”) status five years before applying for the ben-
efit, or are an adult recipient of certain local benefit programs.180 
TPS is another temporary form of lawful permission to remain in the 
United States, usually for six- or 18-month increments, with the possibil-
ity that this permission will be renewable at the end of that period.181 The 
status is country-specific and is provided to nationals of states who are so 
afflicted with humanitarian disaster (e.g., the civil war in Syria, or the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti) that the state department designates these na-
tionals as excused from deportation.182 Persons with TPS are eligible to 
receive work permits.183 The most significant barriers to persons with TPS 
receiving recognition as PRUCOL are the federal statute and regulation 
that explicitly preclude holders of TPS from PRUCOL eligibility.184 Only 
one state, New York, has found a way around this federal rule. 
In Karamalla v. Devine, the Supreme Court of Erie Country, New 
York, recently found that TPS holders should be entitled to the same ben-
efit as PRUCOL individuals.185 Yousif Karamalla, a national of Sudan 
with TPS, applied for and was denied Safety Net Assistance, the New 
York State cash benefit contingent on PRUCOL eligibility.186 Karamalla, 
however, differs from the typical PRUCOL case because the court did not 
determine whether or not TPS status conferred PRUCOL eligibility. In-
stead, the court analyzed whether or not Mr. Karamalla’s TPS entitled 
him to the same benefits as PRUCOL persons on equal protection and 
other state constitutional grounds. 187 The court found that he was entitled 
on these grounds but without making any pronouncements about whether 
or not TPS holders are themselves PRUCOL.188 
 
 179 See e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3 (2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 
18, § 360-3.2 (2020). 
 180 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(xii) (2020). 
 181 8 U.S.C § 1254a (2018). 
 182 See, e.g., Designation of Syrian Arab Republic for Temporary Protected Status, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 19026-01 (Mar. 29, 2012); Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 3476-02 (Jan. 21, 2010); see also Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://perma.cc/XX5R-KQK5 (last updated Mar. 30, 2020). 
 183 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(B) (2018). 
 184 Id. § 1254a(f); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1619 (2020). 
 185 Karamalla v. Devine, Index No. 00107-2015, at 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2016), aff’d, 
73 N.Y.S.3d 819 (App. Div. 2018). 
 186 Id. at 2. 
 187 See id. at 7-9. 
 188 Id. at 7, 8. 
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Nevertheless, the court noted inconsistencies in any PRUCOL defi-
nition that would include applicants with parole, deferred action, or orders 
of supervision, but not TPS—a distinction made by the state agency that 
denied Mr. Karamalla public benefits.189 The court held that it was arbi-
trary and capricious that people with pending deportations should receive 
public benefits “while Mr. Karamalla, a law abiding individual with no 
deportation order, should fall outside the [safety] net. Both may be wait-
ing for conditions in their home country to improve but only the one or-
dered deported or supervised gets assistance? This is not reasoning de-
serving of deference.”190 While not speaking directly on the PRUCOL 
doctrine, the court made a helpful criticism about why a literal interpreta-
tion of the word “temporary” produces inconsistent results that seem in-
herently unfair. The court’s decision also speaks to the counterintuitive 
nature of some PRUCOL designations discussed below.191 Following the 
Karamalla decision, New York State’s OTDA issued a policy statement 
indicating that it would now consider TPS holders PRUCOL.192 
4. Approved Forms I-130 
To become a permanent resident through a family relation, one must 
file both a “Petition for Alien Relative,” Form I-130, and an Application 
to Register Permanent Residence, Form I-485. The I-130 is filed to estab-
lish a bona fide relationship between the prospective immigrant and the 
sponsoring relative. The I-485 application is solely to prove that the ap-
plicant meets the requirements of permanent residency. In many cases, 
the I-130 is filed first. The federal SSI PRUCOL regulation considers in-
dividuals with an approved I-130 to be PRUCOL.193 Several state statutes 
and regulations, including New York’s DOH regulation, California’s 
Medi-Cal program, Massachusetts’s medical assistance program, Penn-
sylvania’s public assistance regulation (now preempted by PRWORA), 
 
 189 Id. at 8-9. 
 190 Karamalla, Index No. 00107-2015, at 9. 
 191 See discussion of Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1985), infra Section 
III.B.3. 
 192 See N.Y. OFFICE OF TEMP. & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, GIS 16 TA/DC053, 
BENEFICIARIES OF TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS (TPS) RECOGNIZED AS PERMANENTLY 
RESIDING UNDER COLOR OF LAW (PRUCOL) FOR SAFETY NET ASSISTANCE (SNA) (2016), 
https://perma.cc/9PKH-E9FJ. 
 193 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(5) (2020) (describing “[a]liens on whose behalf an immediate 
relative petition has been approved and their families covered by the petition” as PRUCOL). 
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and New Mexico’s Medicaid program also designate people with ap-
proved I-130s as such.194 Only two administrative courts have ever con-
sidered the question of whether or not such persons are PRUCOL. 
New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance has at least twice 
held that an approved I-130 confers PRUCOL eligibility.195 In one pre-
PRWORA case, A.S. appealed Passaic County’s decision to remove her 
from Medicaid and AFDC.196 Relying on Holley and a handful of similar 
state cases discussed infra, the Division found that she was PRUCOL be-
cause the then INS had taken no steps to deport her following the approval 
of her I-130.197 The Division also noted that the only reason an immigrant 
visa (for LPR status) had not been issued to A.S. was because of the back-
log of cases resulting from heavy demand.198 While the opinion does not 
specify, these facts imply that A.S. had an approved I-130 but was not yet 
able to file the I-485 application for permanent residence. This raises the 
question of whether or not an individual with an approved I-130 would 
still be PRUCOL if they were nonetheless ineligible to apply for a visa 
for any reason, such as inadmissibility. This particular case thus leaves 
open the question of whether or not an approved I-130 is always sufficient 
to confer PRUCOL eligibility, or whether it must be an approved I-130 
recipient who is also eligible for an immigrant visa. 
In another case before New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assis-
tance, C.C., an Italian national who was denied AFDC and Medicaid, like-
wise held an approved Form I-130.199 In that case, C.C.’s U.S. citizen-
spouse had filed the I-130 to petition for her.200 Following their separation 
on account of domestic violence,201 C.C. filed an I-360 application to self-
 
 194 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3(f) (2020); 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C)(3), 
(10) (LexisNexis 2020) (describing “noncitizens who have filed an application, petition, or 
request to obtain a lawfully present status that has been accepted as properly filed” as 
PRUCOL); N.M. CODE R. § 8.106.100.7(B)(16)(b)(v) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2 (j)(1)(ii)(e) (2020); 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3)(v) (2020). 
 195 See C.C. v. Hudson Cty. Div. of Welfare, No. HPW 12128-95, 1996 WL 669189 (N.J. 
Adm. March 27, 1996); A.S. v. Passaic Cty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., No. HPW 2528-95, 1995 WL 
605372 (N.J. Adm. June 16, 1995). 
 196 A.S., 1995 WL 605372, at *1. 
 197 Id. at *5. 
 198 Id. 
 199 C.C., 1996 WL 669189, at *1. 
 200 Id. 
 201 The opinion does not say if the I-485 was rejected, denied or withdrawn, but implies 
that one of these occurred, both because C.C. must take an alternative route to adjustment of 
status and because the opinion never cites to a pending I-485 as reason to confer PRUCOL 
status. Also, in the general course of USCIS practice, if an interview cannot be completed, the 
adjustment application is eventually rejected or denied. 
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petition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).202 The opin-
ion did not say if the I-360 had yet been approved but noted that the I-485 
had not yet been filed because C.C.’s counsel was awaiting further evi-
dence to include in the application.203 The Division noted, however, that 
the initial I-130 was approved and that “adjustment of status can be 
achieved,” making C.C.’s case “even stronger than that of the plaintiff in 
Holley,” who had no approved application.204 
 
5. Non-Immigrant Visas 
Individuals with approved applications for non-immigrant visas, 
whose approved applications this taxonomy might assume places them 
into Category A, are generally not regarded as PRUCOL by many admin-
istrative agencies and courts. This is because non-immigrant visas are 
generally not considered “permanent,” even as Holley uses the term. It 
should be noted that non-immigrant visa holders are designated as law-
fully present immigrants for purposes of health insurance under the ACA; 
however, they are generally not considered PRUCOL for all other types 
of benefits. 
Generally, state statutes and regulations do not list or include non-
immigrant visas such as foreign or exchange student, or visitor visas in 
their lists or definitions of PRUCOL.205 The federal PRUCOL list explic-
itly says “[n]one of the categories allows SSI eligibility for non-immi-
grants.”206 
Sometimes treated differently, however, are the “special” non-immi-
grant visas, specifically the U, T, and S visas for victims of qualifying 
crimes, victims of human trafficking, and witnesses against criminal de-
fendants, respectively, and the K and V visas, for fiancées of USCs or 
LPRs and relatives of applicants for adjustment of status, respectively.207 
S, K, V, and T non-immigrant visa holders are considered PRUCOL un-
der New York’s DOH definition.208 Another exception is Pennsylvania’s 
public assistance PRUCOL list (now preempted by PROWRA), which 
included “permanent nonimmigrants as established by the Compact of 
 
 202 C.C., 1996 WL 669189, at *2 (“[S]he filed for immigration benefits for herself and her 
three children under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)”). 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at *4. 
 205 See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b) (2020). 
 206 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b) (2020). 
 207 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(i), (S)-(V). T-visa non-immigrant visa holders, who are vic-
tims of human trafficking, are considered qualified aliens under federal law. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1641(c)(4) (2018). 
 208 See N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 110, at 10-11. 
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Free Association Act of 1985,”209 referring to special non-immigrant vi-
sas available to nationals of certain Pacific Island nations.210 Even this is 
an extremely narrow category of non-immigrants. No court has yet exam-
ined the PRUCOL eligibility of a special non-immigrant, but most of the 
case law that has taken up the question of whether conventional non-im-
migrants are PRUCOL has concluded that they are not. 
An Alabama state court, for example, found that one Dr. Joseph, a 
national of Jamaica, was not PRUCOL despite his current H1-B visa.211 
An H1-B visa is a non-immigrant work visa that expires on a specific 
date, and the court held that the visa did not satisfy Holley’s definition of 
“permanent” because it was “specifically for a nonimmigrant status with 
a definite ending.”212 In Sharma v. Board of Review, a New Jersey court 
likewise held that both an H1-B and a TN visa213 did not render their 
holder PRUCOL.214 In that unpublished decision, the New Jersey court 
said that Anil Sharma, a citizen of Canada, was ineligible for unemploy-
ment benefits because, inter alia, he was not a permanent legal resident 
and not PRUCOL.215 The court gave little explanation for how it reached 
this conclusion but like other courts seemed focused on the idea that the 
non-immigrant visa was not “permanent” enough.216 
A lower court case from Florida, Madourie v. State Department of 
Health and Rehabilitative Services, came to a similar conclusion.217 At 
issue was not whether the denied applicant for AFDC benefits, Jamaican 
national Denise Madourie, was PRUCOL, but rather whether or not she 
was a resident of Florida.218 Residency of Florida was another require-
ment of AFDC eligibility in the state at the time, separate from PRUCOL 
status, but the court found that the Jamaican national was not a resident 
because she held only a non-immigrant B2 visitor visa (colloquially 
known as a tourist visa).219 The court pointed to the purpose of the non-
immigrant visa, which is explicitly for those who do not intend to stay 
 
 209 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3)(xvi) (2020). 
 210 Kevin Morris, Navigating the Compact of Free Association: Three Decades of Super-
vised Self-Governance, 41 U. Haw. L. Rev. 384, 402 (2019). 
 211 Joseph v. State, 600 So. 2d 298, 301 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). 
 212 Id. 
 213 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(a) (2020). A TN visa is a special visa for temporary professionals who 
are Canadian or Mexican nationals. 
 214 Sharma v. Bd. of Review, A-0607-11T2, 2013 WL 1222672, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2013). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Madourie v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 667 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1995) (finding that plaintiff’s B-2 visa “renders her statement of residency questionable”). 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
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permanently in the United States.220 Despite numerous renewals of her B2 
visa, the court held that the nature of the visa meant that Ms. Madourie 
did not intend to immigrate permanently into the country and therefore 
could not be considered a Florida resident.221 The case, while not speaking 
directly on the PRUCOL doctrine, nonetheless reinforces the idea that 
non-immigrant visas fail to satisfy the permanency requirement of 
PRUCOL. Other state courts have reached similar conclusions about the 
non-permanency of non-immigrant visas, albeit outside the context of the 
PRUCOL doctrine.222 
Only a couple of cases have differed in their conclusions. In 1993, a 
North Carolina state court found that those holding valid Seasonal Agri-
cultural Worker (“SAW”) non-immigrant visas were “lawfully pre-
sent”223 and, so it follows a fortiori, PRUCOL. David R. Hopkins was a 
tobacco farmer who employed, among others, persons with SAW non-
immigrant visas.224 Mr. Hopkins, who was required by North Carolina 
law to pay unemployment taxes on his employees, argued that he should 
not have to pay those taxes on SAW employees because they were them-
selves not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits.225 The Court of 
Appeals of North Carolina found that the SAW employees were lawfully 
present and thus eligible for unemployment insurance benefits in the 
state.226 However, one who is lawfully present is also PRUCOL,227 and 
thus the decision provides authority for the proposition that SAW non-
immigrant visa holders are PRUCOL. 
In M.R. v. Passaic County Board of Social Services, a decision by 
New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance, a national of Zambia who 
 
 220 Id. at 238-39. 
 221 Id. at 239. 
 222 See Pinilla v. Bd. of Review in Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 382 A.2d 921, 923 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1978) (finding that a non-immigrant B2 visitor visa holder was in the United 
States temporarily and unauthorized to work in the country, and thus not eligible for unem-
ployment benefits during the time she worked); Jimoh v. Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Review, 902 
A.2d 608, 611 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (declining to rule on the question of whether the F-1 
visa holder Tajudeen A. Jimoh was PRUCOL for purposes of state unemployment insurance 
eligibility because the issue was not preserved on appeal). 
 223 State ex rel. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n of N.C. v. Hopkins, 432 S.E.2d 703, 705 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 224 Id. at 703-04. 
 225 Id. at 704. 
 226 Id. at 705. 
 227 See Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323, 334 (Ill. 1992) (“If it is conceded that Castillo 
and Jimenez were ‘lawfully present for the purposes of performing services’ from the date of 
IRCA’s passage, it makes no sense to say that Castillo and Jimenez were not also ‘under color 
of law’ as of such date. We find this to be the case because . . . the ‘under color of law’ prong 
of PRUCOL is a less restrictive requirement than the ‘lawfully present’ requirement . . . of 
FUTA.”). 
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held a J-1 non-immigrant student visa228 successfully argued that she was 
PRUCOL.229 The Zambian national had applied for a waiver of the J-1 
visa’s two-year foreign residence requirement on the basis of hardship, 
arguing that her husband had a medical condition that could not be treated 
in Zambia and that deportation would result in his death.230 After filing 
her waiver application, M.K. had applied for AFDC benefits but was de-
nied by the County Board of Social Services on the basis that she was not 
PRUCOL.231 Relying on a number of decisions, including Holley,232 the 
Division concluded that “federal law rejects any attempt to deny a benefit 
where the INS has issued official documents” and that M.K. was 
PRUCOL because she “has applied for waiver to the residency require-
ment and that application is now pending.”233 It seems appropriate to cat-
egorize M.K.’s case with non-immigrant visas instead of pending appli-
cations because the application that was pending here was for an 
extension of a non-immigrant visa, implying that the non-immigrant visa 
itself conferred PRUCOL status. So far, no court appears to have consid-
ered other non-immigrant visas, such as F-1 visas, for example.234 
 
B. Category Two: Pending Applications 
The federal PRUCOL regulation definition lists pending applications 
for adjustment of status as another circumstance that confers PRUCOL 
eligibility.235 California, New York, and New Mexico also list pending 
applications for adjustment of status. Massachusetts adds pending appli-
cations for asylum, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and 
any other “application, petition, or request to obtain a lawfully present 
 
 228 J-1 visas permit exchange students to enter the United States temporarily. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(J) (2018). 
 229 M.K. v. Passaic Cty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., No. HPW 2276-95, 1995 WL 508073, at *1 
(N.J. Adm. June 2, 1995). 
 230 Id. at *2. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at *3-4. 
 233 Id. at *5. 
 234 The authors’ research for this article did not uncover any court decisions in which other 
non-immigrant visas were considered. See e.g., Jimoh v. Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Review, 902 
A.2d 608, 610-11 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (declining on procedural grounds to address J-1 
visa holder’s argument that his status made him PRUCOL for purposes of state unemployment 
benefit eligibility). 
 235 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(6) (2020) (where USCIS categorizes these applications as 
“properly filed”). 
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status” to its list.236 New York’s DOH also includes pending applications 
for asylum, cancellation of removal, and suspension of deportation.237 
Multiple federal and state court decisions have found that PRUCOL 
eligibility is conferred upon a person where they have an outstanding ap-
plication for relief that has not yet received an answer from immigration 
authorities. 
1. Pending Applications for Prosecutorial Discretion 
One federal opinion discussing the PRUCOL doctrine in detail is 
Farjam v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration.238 Decided by 
a court in the Eastern District of New York a year before PRWORA made 
PRUCOL individuals ineligible for SSI, at issue was whether or not a 75-
year-old national of Iran, Akhtar Farjam, was PRUCOL for SSI pur-
poses.239 Ms. Farjam had submitted applications for “voluntary departure 
or deferred action” status, but she had not yet received a reply from the 
former INS (whose particular functions in this case are now carried out 
by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services [“USCIS”] under 
DHS).240 The court relied upon the knowledge-plus-permission standard 
set out in Holley and elaborated in Berger.241 The court went on to clarify 
that the phrase “does not contemplate enforcing” does not mean official 
determination or authorization of the same, but rather includes non-citi-
zens whose residence in the United States continues by virtue of “acqui-
escence.”242 Therefore, to be consistent with Berger, PRUCOL includes: 
scenarios in which INS does not respond to requests . . . yet in 
which official acquiescence to an individual’s presence is never-
theless present. Such a situation would be present when INS is 
made aware on numerous occasions of the presence of an illegal 
alien yet does not take action to enforce the departure.243 
The INS had been aware of Ms. Farjam’s presence since she re-
quested voluntary departure of deferred action status but took no steps to 
deport her, and therefore, despite the fact that no response had yet been 
received, the court held that Ms. Farjam was PRUCOL.244 
 
 236 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C)(8), (9), (10) (2020). 
 237 See N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 110, at 10. 
 238 Farjam v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-94-4486 (CPS), 1995 WL 500477 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995). 
 239 Id. at *1-2. 
 240 Id. at *1. 
 241 Id. at *3-4. 
 242 Id. at *4 (quoting Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
 243 Farjam, 1995 WL 500477, at *4 (citation omitted). 
 244 Id. at *5. 
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Similar facts were before the Supreme Court of New York, Nassau 
County, in Brunswick Hospital Center, Inc. v. Daines.245 Clare Thomp-
son, an undocumented national of Jamaica, suffered a stroke and was ad-
mitted to Brunswick Hospital and then a nursing home.246 Brunswick 
Hospital filed an application on Ms. Thompson’s behalf with USCIS for 
voluntary departure in order to make her PRUCOL and thereby eligible 
for non-emergency Medicaid.247 That application for voluntary departure 
went unanswered for seven years and remained unanswered at the time of 
the court’s decision.248 When Brunswick Hospital applied for Medicaid 
for Ms. Thompson, they were denied by Nassau County DSS and DOH, 
which argued that Ms. Thompson’s outstanding application for voluntary 
departure did not make her PRUCOL.249 The Brunswick Hospital Center 
sued the New York State DOH, and the court decided that Ms. Thompson 
was indeed PRUCOL.250 
The court found that the authorities had knowledge of Ms. Thomp-
son’s presence because USCIS had “canceled” her passport and because 
that agency had received her application for voluntary departure.251 The 
court further found acquiescence from USCIS’s failure to try and deport 
Ms. Thompson for seven years since receiving her application, adding 
that there was no requirement that Ms. Thompson follow up with USCIS 
on the status of her request for voluntary departure in order for her to 
maintain her PRUCOL status.252 The court ordered the state agency to 
restore her Medicaid coverage immediately.253 Notably, the court cited 
Holley and other state decisions on PRUCOL status for the proposition 
that the “terms and requirements defining PRUCOL should be broadly 
interpreted.”254 
Finally, recall that in M.K. v. Passaic County Board of Social Ser-
vices, New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance found M.K., a non-
citizen with a pending application for a waiver of the termination of her 
J-1 non-immigrant visa permit, was PRUCOL for purposes of AFDC eli-
gibility because “federal law rejects any attempt to deny [a] benefit where 
the INS has issued official documents” and because M.K. had “applied 
 
 245 Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Daines, No. 019223/09, 2010 WL 623707 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Feb. 22, 2010). 
 246 Id. at *1. 
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2002. 
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for waiver to the residency requirement and that application [was] now 
pending.”255 
2. Pending Applications for Adjustment of Status to Lawful 
Permanent Residence 
Five states currently list or formerly listed a pending application for 
permanent residency (i.e., an application to become a green card holder) 
as a PRUCOL category,256 and a number of state courts have concurred 
with this interpretation. 
In one of the first New York state cases to consider the PRUCOL 
doctrine, the First Department considered in 1979 whether a deceased 
Greek national was posthumously PRUCOL during the period of her life 
in which she had a pending application for permanent residence.257 Ms. 
Papadopoulos had suffered a stroke for which she received care and, fol-
lowing her death, her daughter sued New York State’s DSS on her behalf 
for Medicaid coverage that had been denied during her period of care.258 
The court relied on Holley and found that Ms. Papadapolous’s pending 
green card application made her PRUCOL because the INS regulation 
forbade her deportation while her application was pending.259 
In a scenario similar to the one in Brunswick Hospital Center, the 
South Nassau Communities Hospital brought suit in St. Francis Hospital 
v. D’Elia against Nassau County’s DSS on behalf of one of its patients, 
Concepcion Dominquez, a national of Spain, after she was denied Medi-
caid coverage for her care.260 Ms. Dominquez had a pending application 
for an “immigrant visa,” and, quoting Papadopoulos and Holley, the court 
found that this made her PRUCOL.261 Specifically, the court reasoned: 
Mrs. Dominquez’ entry into this country on a valid non-immi-
grant visa, her timely application for an immigrant visa, the cor-
respondence with her by the consular service of the Department 
of State at her residence in the United States after the expiration 
date of her non-immigrant visa, and the failure of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service to deport her, all impel the conclusion 
 
 255 M.K. v. Passaic Cty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., No. HPW 2276-95, 1995 WL 508073, at *5 
(N.J. Adm. June 2, 1995). 
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 257 Papadopoulos v. Shang, 414 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153-54 (App. Div. 1979). 
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 260 St. Francis Hosp. v. D’Elia, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104, 108-09 (App. Div. 1979). 
 261 Id. at 109-10. 
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that at the time of her admission to the hospital Mrs. Dominquez 
was residing in this country under color of law.262 
The facts do not clarify whether an application for an “immigrant 
visa” refers to a pending I-130 or I-485, or both, but that term properly 
refers here to an I-485.263 New York’s Second Department would draw 
the same conclusion in a similar case years later.264 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon followed Papadopoulos, St. Francis 
Hospital, and Holley in Rubio v. Employment Division, when it found that 
Mexican national Ascencion Rubio was PRUCOL during the time in 
which he had a pending application to adjust his status through his U.S. 
citizen spouse.265 While his application was pending, Mr. Rubio was also 
granted permission to exit and re-enter the United States, and this permis-
sion was extended repeatedly.266 The court noted that Mr. Rubio “was 
married to a United States citizen, working for a United States business 
and had begun the necessary steps to achieve a legal permanent resi-
dence,” and reasoned from this that INS knew of his residence “by its 
routine regular extensions of his voluntary departure,” and therefore “had 
acquiesced in it.”267 
The first Illinois state court to consider the PRUCOL doctrine like-
wise found that a non-citizen Medicaid applicant was PRUCOL on the 
basis of a pending application for permanent residence.268 Interestingly, 
however, that court questioned whether the receipt notice for an I-130 was 
sufficient proof that the applicant had a pending application for permanent 
residence.269 The court found that it was not sufficient evidence of such, 
relying on the Medicaid and Medicare Guide,270 an instructional guide-
book produced by HHS, which was in use until 1996 and which required 
a form I-94 or an I-210 as proof of a pending application for permanent 
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residence.271 Courts do not often raise the issue of what constitutes proof 
of a pending application. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that 
pending “alien relative petitions” or other applications for legal perma-
nent resident status confer PRUCOL eligibility.272 In Industrial Commis-
sion of State v. Arteaga, the Court came to this conclusion regarding the 
plaintiffs’ PRUCOL eligibility for FUTA benefits where the plaintiffs 
held valid work authorization and pending applications for adjustment of 
status.273 Perhaps most notable is Sandoval v. Colorado Division of Em-
ployment: it is the only Colorado case in which the court said explicitly 
that a pending application for legal permanent residence is sufficient to 
confer PRUCOL status for purposes of FUTA eligibility, even when the 
applicant does not also have a valid work permit.274 Martin Sandoval, who 
was brought to the United States as a child without inspection, was placed 
into deportation proceedings, whereupon he applied for non-LPR cancel-
lation of removal and then later applied to adjust his status through a U.S. 
citizen spouse.275 Following Arteaga and Holley, the court held that each 
of those applications in and of themselves were sufficient to confer 
PRUCOL eligibility upon Mr. Sandoval.276 
In Yatribi v. Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado, an in-
dividual with a pending “alien relative” petition to adjust status was held 
to be PRUCOL.277 The court found Mustapha Yatribi was PRUCOL for 
purposes of FUTA eligibility, not only because of his pending application 
to adjust status, but also because of a valid work permit granted while his 
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 277 Yatribi v. Indus. Comm’n of Colo., 700 P.2d 929, 930 (Colo. App. 1985). 
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application was pending.278 The court held the same in a later case, Zan-
jani v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, finding that Bahman Zanjani 
was PRUCOL because he also had a pending adjustment of status appli-
cation and a valid work permit.279 The court noted that “[p]etitioner was 
also here under color of law because the INS made no effort to deport him 
during the application process,”280 and “petitioner became eligible for un-
employment benefits when the INS demonstrated its intention to allow 
petitioner to remain in the country until he obtained permanent resident 
alien status.”281 
In only one case, In re Fodor, has a court appeared to say that an 
individual with a pending application for adjustment of status is not 
PRUCOL. This minority view came from a federal bankruptcy court in 
Florida. Zsolt Fodor, a Hungarian national, had a pending application for 
permanent resident status but was denied the benefit of Florida’s home-
stead exemption, which allows debtors to be exempt from the claims of 
creditors on the debtor’s home.282 The exemption is available to debtors 
with a residence in the state and with the actual intent to live in the state 
permanently, which Florida courts have interpreted to mean that the 
debtor has to be a citizen or a legal permanent resident.283 
Mr. Fodor was a debtor who owed two other individuals $44,480.54 
and argued that he should be protected from their claim for that sum 
against his home under the homestead exemption because he was 
PRUCOL and therefore, he reasoned, a permanent resident of the state.284 
The court disagreed, distinguishing Mr. Fodor’s pending application for 
lawful permanent residence from individuals with pending asylum appli-
cations. The court averred that, unlike individuals with a pending asylum 
application, Mr. Fodor’s “residential status” was “temporary” because he 
“merely held an Employment Authorization card.” 285 The court seemed 
unaware that an asylum applicant could hold the same and concluded that 
because he was “temporary,” Mr. Fodor could not establish the intent to 
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make his home a “permanent homestead” as the homestead provision re-
quired.286 Without explicitly saying Mr. Fodor was not PRUCOL, in dis-
tinguishing his case the way that it did, the court implied that his pending 
application did not satisfy the “permanent” element of the PRUCOL doc-
trine, at least not in the way someone with a pending asylum application 
would.287 
3. Pending Applications for Asylum 
After PRWORA in 1996, asylees and refugees, as well as grantees 
of “withholding of removal” (a form of refugee-like relief) became “qual-
ified aliens” for purposes of federal benefit eligibility, making them eli-
gible for most federal entitlements.288 Prior to PRWORA, however, 
asylees, refugees, and grantees of withholding of removal were generally 
considered PRUCOL,289 and many states’ regulations listed them this 
way.290 But now that persons granted asylum are “qualified aliens,” the 
question that remains is whether or not PRUCOL eligibility is conferred 
upon non-citizens with a pending application for asylum. 
While only Massachusetts regulations explicitly list asylum appli-
cants as PRUCOL,291 case law from five states agrees with that assess-
ment. For example, the Supreme Court of Rockland County in New York 
found that a national of Bulgaria with a pending asylum application and 
a work permit was PRUCOL.292 New Jersey’s Division of Economic As-
sistance likewise found that non-citizens with pending asylum applica-
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and second departments with respect to pending green card applications discussed above. Id. 
at 885-96. 
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tions and valid work authorizations were PRUCOL, noting that either fac-
tor conferred PRUCOL status on them.293 And a majority of the Supreme 
Court of Colorado found a group of Polish nationals with pending asylum 
applications and valid work authorizations were PRUCOL for purposes 
of FUTA eligibility,294 although the court appeared to rely heavily on the 
applicants’ valid work authorization and eligibility for prosecutorial dis-
cretion (to wit, voluntary departure) in rendering its decision.295 
In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. v. Solis, the 
Supreme Court of Florida also considered whether an applicant with a 
pending asylum case was PRUCOL, this time for purposes of AFDC and 
Medicaid, and found that they were.296 Luisa Solis and her five children 
were Nicaraguan nationals who feared persecution in that country, and 
thus applied for political asylum.297 Uniquely, the court cited the testi-
mony of an INS employee who testified that an individual with a pending 
asylum application is not deported unless they are “an absolute threat to 
public safety” and that their case could be pending for as long as 30 
years.298 Florida’s Supreme Court regarded this as proof that the INS had 
knowledge of Louisa Solis’s presence in the United States but was acqui-
escing to her presence, and concluded that she was therefore PRUCOL, 
looking to Holley.299 The Court followed Holley’s definition of “perma-
nent” and regarded Ms. Solis’s presence as “permanent” because there 
was no defined end point to her time in the country.300 
A lower Florida state court in Lisboa v. Dade County Property Ap-
praiser re-affirmed Solis in 1998 when, citing to Solis, it concluded that 
another asylum seeker was PRUCOL, this time for purposes of Florida’s 
homestead tax exemption.301 The Court said that Mr. Lisboa, like Ms. 
Solis, “ha[d] a ‘permanent’ status,” and “[t]he fact that his status can be 
‘dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the 
individual’ does not detract from its permanency.”302 This, too, echoes 
Holley’s interpretation of “permanent.” 
 
 293 S.D. v. Passaic Cty. Welfare Agency, No. HPW 2524-95, 1995 WL 508076, at *3 (N.J. 
Admin. Jun. 5, 1995). 
 294 Div. of Emp’t & Training v. Turynski, 735 P.2d 469, 472 (Colo. 1987). 
 295 See id. at 472. 
 296 Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Solis, 580 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1991). 
 297 Id. at 147. 
 298 Id. at 149.  
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. at 149-50. 
 301 Lisboa v. Dade Cty. Prop. Appraiser, 705 So. 2d 704, 707-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 302 Id. at 707 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (2018)); see also DeQuervain v. Desguin, 
927 So. 2d 232, 235-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (reaffirming that asylum applicants satisfy 
the homestead tax’s permanent-residency requirement). 
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Perhaps what is most notable about Solis is that it is the only decision 
in which a court appears to say that asylee derivatives listed on a pending 
asylum application are as PRUCOL as the applicant herself. Ms. Solis had 
five children, who presumably were listed on her application. The court 
appeared to infer that the government knew about her children as much 
as it knew about her when it concluded, “[W]e agree with the district court 
that Solis and her family fit within the PRUCOL language.”303 Generally, 
when an asylum applicant wins their claim, their non-citizen children or 
spouse living in the United States and listed on their application are auto-
matically granted status as derivative asylees.304 In this respect, the deriv-
ative asylee has a pending application for status as much as the principal 
asylum applicant. The Solis court appeared to recognize this and regarded 
the whole family as PRUCOL for this reason. 
One question that may arise when considering the PRUCOL desig-
nation of a pending asylum claim is whether the asylum applicant’s 
PRUCOL eligibility persists if their application is denied by USCIS but 
then referred to the immigration court in the context of a deportation pro-
ceeding. In Gillar v. Employment Division, the Supreme Court of Oregon 
answered that question in the affirmative.305 Bohuslav J. Gillar, a national 
of then-Czechoslovakia, was initially denied asylum by INS and opted to 
renew his request before an immigration court.306 Today, a denial by 
USCIS would result in the applicant’s case being referred to the immigra-
tion court for deportation proceedings, where the application for asylum 
would be reviewed de novo.307 At issue was whether or not Mr. Gillar was 
PRUCOL for purposes of the state unemployment insurance.308 The court 
relied on Holley and a number of other cases to reason that, because the 
law said that Mr. Gillar could not be deported until a determination on his 
case was made, he was residing under color of law until that time.309 The 
Gillar court further said that he was permanently residing in the United 
States because, while he was awaiting the determination, his time in the 
country had “no defined end or defined purpose.”310 The court’s last point 
echoes the reasoning of the Solis court. 
One federal appellate court came to a different conclusion about 
pending asylum applications. In 1985, it was the Ninth Circuit’s turn to 
 
 303 Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Solis, 580 So. 2d 146 at 150 (Fla. 1991) (emphasis 
added). 
 304 See e.g., Mobombo v. Holder, 403 Fed. App’x 873, 874 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 305 Gillar v. Emp’t Div., 717 P.2d 131, 137 (Or. 1986). 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. at 134. 
 309 Id. at 137. 
 310 Id. at 138. 
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consider whether a pending asylum application conferred PRUCOL sta-
tus: in Sudomir v. McMahon, three asylum seekers applied for AFDC ben-
efits but were denied because they were asylum applicants.311 The asylum 
seekers brought a class action against the state of California and sought a 
preliminary injunction to prevent California from denying AFDC to asy-
lum seekers.312 The district court denied the injunction, and the asylum 
seekers appealed to the Ninth Circuit.313 The question before the Ninth 
Circuit was whether or not asylum seekers were permanently residing un-
der the color of law.314 
While the plaintiffs invoked Holley’s knowledge and permission 
standard and the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the word “perma-
nently,”315 the court did not rely on that decision or the one in Berger.316 
Instead, the court went against precedent and said that “[i]t stretches this 
language considerably to have [the word ‘permanently’] embrace” asy-
lum applicants,317 and it sided with the state government’s more limited 
definition of what PRUCOL and “permanently” meant.318 The court 
agreed that the applicants were in the country under the color of law but 
said their statuses were not permanent, but inchoate.319 In the court’s 
view, “permanently” connoted a situation in which the person’s status 
could theoretically continue indefinitely, as was the case in Holley, not 
where the applicant’s status merely “[gave] rise to the possibility” of in-
definite residence, which it saw as temporary.320 The court also described 
temporary grants of work authorization as similarly inchoate.321 Finding 
this a permissible construction of the statute, the court found for the state 
of California, upholding the denial of AFDC benefits.322  
Interestingly, the Sudomir court did note that, even by its narrower 
definition of PRUCOL, persons with indefinite stays of deportation or ex-
tensions of voluntary departure were PRUCOL because they had been 
 
 311 Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). Elizabeth Sudomir sought 
asylum from Poland, while Ebrahim Nejati and Mahin Vojdani sought asylum from Iran. Id. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. at 1459. 
 315 Id. at 1460-61. 
 316 Sudomir does not follow Berger but merely states in a footnote that the Berger consent 
decree did not include pending asylum applications, ignoring the actual reasoning the Berger 
court applied in its opinion, to wit, that there is a need to interpret the PRUCOL doctrine 
broadly. See Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1460 n.6. 
 317 Id. at 1459. 
 318 Id. at 1461-62. 
 319 Id. at 1461. 
 320 Id. at 1462. 
 321 Id. at 1464. 
 322 Id. 
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“subject to official review” and were “entitled to reside in the United 
States for an indefinite period.”323 The court also noted that temporary 
parolees were PRUCOL because the statute explicitly made them so, but 
did not reflect at all on the ostensible contradiction between its own “per-
manent” vs. “inchoate” definition and the statute’s explicit grant of 
PRUCOL status to temporary parolees.324 Instead, the court explained the 
inconsistency by noting that temporary parolees were given permission to 
enter the country and remain, while asylum applicants entered or re-
mained in the United States “illegally,”325 an inaccurate assessment.326 
The court explained this as consistent with Congress’s intent to “end the 
ad hoc use of parole authority, which had been implemented by custom 
rather than clearly defined by law.”327 Furthermore, the court pointed to 
the INS practice of forcing some persons who present claims for asylum 
at the border to wait outside the United States for a determination on their 
application, and said that defining asylum applicants as PRUCOL “would 
seriously undermine this new scheme,”328 referring presumably to both 
the practice of having some asylum applicants wait outside the country 
and disdain for “ad hoc” forms of relief. 
The dissent by Judge William C. Canby did follow Holley’s defini-
tion of “permanently.” Judge Canby, too, looked to the statutory defini-
tion of “permanently”329: 
[A] relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished 
from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even though 
it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of 
the United States or of the individual, in accordance with the 
law.330 
 
 323 Id. at 1459-60. Note that the court also dismissed the asylum seekers’ argument that 
the PRUCOL requirement violated the federal Equal Protection Clause, finding rational basis 
review was appropriate and upholding the district court’s finding that there was a rational 
reason for the distinction. Id. at 1466. 
 324 Id. at 1462. 
 325 Id. at 1459, 1462. 
 326 The assessment that asylum applicants were in the country “illegally” is inaccurate 
since they are permitted to enter after a preliminary determination is made that they have a 
reasonable fear of persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (describing one’s entry into the United 
States for the purpose of seeking asylum as a lawful process). 
 327 Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1463 (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 5 (1970)) (alterations omit-
ted). 
 328 Id. at 1462-63. 
 329 Id. at 1467 (Canby, J., dissenting). 
 330 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (2018). 
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Judge Canby noted that “temporary,” as it is defined in the statute, is 
used to describe non-immigrant visa holders, such as students and tour-
ists, persons for whom “there is never any intention of abandoning the 
country of origin as home,”331 a distinction from “permanently” that 
would certainly mean that asylum applicants are PRUCOL inasmuch as 
they have every intention of abandoning their country of origin. They are 
not temporary, Judge Canby argued, simply because “their continued 
presence is solely dependent upon the possibility of having their applica-
tions for asylum acted upon favorably,” as the majority insisted.332 On the 
contrary, Judge Canby found this description of asylum seekers more 
analogous to temporary parolees and conditional entrants, who might also 
have their continuous presence revoked at any time but are nonetheless 
PRUCOL,333 and to persons with indefinite stays of deportation or grants 
of voluntary departure, who also remain in the country only until the im-
migration authorities revoke their permission and who are also 
PRUCOL.334 Finally, Judge Canby argued that the Refugee Act cannot be 
interpreted as relegating asylum seekers to non-PRUCOL status, espe-
cially because Judge Canby could not “ascribe to Congress, in passing the 
Refugee Act for clearly humanitarian purposes,” an intent to deny asylum 
seekers “the means to feed, clothe and house their families” while remain-
ing in the United States or “an intent to require victims of persecution to 
run that kind of gauntlet.”335 
Sudomir may be the most controversial case in PRUCOL history. 
The jurisdictions discussed above have not followed it and some courts 
have explicitly rejected it.336 Still other courts have tried to narrow its 
precedent by applying it only to facts like those before the Sudomir court. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado has said that Sudomir does not apply to 
an asylum applicant seeking unemployment benefits under FUTA, or its 
state counterpart, nor to asylum applicants with work authorization, nor 
to applicants for asylum who are “covered by a policy of extended volun-
tary departure,” that is, likely to receive some form of prosecutorial dis-
cretion even in the absence of their asylum application.337 
 
 331 Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1467 (Canby, J., dissenting). 
 332 Id. at 1468 (quoting id. at 1462). 
 333 Id. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Id. 
 336 See, e.g., Castillo v. Jackson, 566 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he narrow 
view of the Sudomir court should be rejected.”); Gillar v. Emp’t Div., 717 P.2d 131, 140 (Or. 
1986) (“We too reject the Sudomir proposition that asylum applicants can never be ‘perma-
nently residing’ in this country and are therefore automatically ineligible for a variety of ben-
efits.”). 
 337 Div. of Emp’t & Training v. Turynski, 735 P.2d 469, 472 (Colo. 1987). 
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Sudomir may be an outlier—but it has followers. The first California 
state court to consider the PRUCOL doctrine338 was the Second District 
Court of Appeal of California, in Zurmati v. McMahon. At issue was 
whether or not Golgotai Zurmati, a national of Afghanistan, was 
PRUCOL for purposes of AFDC benefits where she had a pending asy-
lum application.339 The state court found that she was not PRUCOL de-
spite her having valid work authorization and the standard asylum receipt 
notice that said she was permitted to remain in the United States at least 
until her case was decided.340 The court followed Sudomir and held that 
Ms. Zurmati’s status was not “permanent.”341 The court limited the 
PRUCOL doctrine to those who were residing in the United States as the 
result of a “affirmative admission or grant of status.”342 
Zurmati was followed by its sister court, the First District Court of 
Appeal, in Khasminskaya v. Lum.343 Tsilia Khasminskaya, a Ukrainian 
national, was also an asylum applicant who applied for and was denied 
state-funded general cash assistance.344 Nevertheless, following Sudomir 
and Zurmati, the Lum court held that Ms. Khaminskaya was not lawfully 
present (and thus, not PRUCOL) because “her residence was not yet es-
tablished as lawful on a permanent basis.”345 
Outside of the Ninth Circuit, Sudomir was followed on at least two 
other occasions, possibly three. The most significant of these was Joudah 
v. Ohio Department of Human Services, in which an Ohio court of appeals 
upheld a lower court’s heavy reliance upon Sudomir to find that an asylum 
applicant with valid work authorization was not PRUCOL.346 The appel-
late court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in following 
Sudomir and determining that Mahdi Joudah, a national of Kuwait, did 
not satisfy the “permanent” element of PRUCOL.347 
Sudomir was again followed in a brief decision issued by the New 
Jersey Employment Compensation Board, which, in its failure to mention 
 
 338 Zurmati v. McMahon, 225 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (Ct. App. 2d 1986) (“There are no re-
ported decisions of the California courts on the issue presented.”). 
 339 Id. at 375-76. 
 340 Id. at 379-80. 
 341 Id. at 380-82. 
 342 Id. However, the court also distinguished the facts before it from those in Holley and 
attempted to make the holding in that case logically consistent with its own by saying that the 
Holley petitioner was given explicit permission to remain until her children were adults. Id. at 
381-82. 
 343 Khasminskaya v. Lum, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915 (Ct. App. 1st 1996). 
 344 Id. at 916. 
 345 Id. at 919-20. 
 346 Joudah v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 641 N.E.2d 288, 290-91 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
The lower court was the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County. Id. at 289. 
 347 Id. at 290-91. But see Vespremi v. Giles, 427 N.E.2d 30, 31-32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980). 
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Holley or any other contrary decisions available at the time, clearly 
cherry-picked case law to avoid compliance with stare decisis.348 That 
tribunal, too, found that an asylum applicant was not PRUCOL, this time 
for purposes of qualifying for unemployment benefits.349 
Finally, a decision from New York State’s Fourth Department, Bibe-
zic v. Schauseil, held that an asylum applicant was not PRUCOL.350 While 
this decision was then mentioned by the Supreme Court of Rockland 
County in Tonashka v. Weinberg,351 the Bibezic opinion itself is not pub-
lished and is otherwise unavailable, so it remains unknown whether or not 
the Fourth Department followed Sudomir or simply came to the same con-
clusion on its own reasoning. 
All told, courts in four states (California, Ohio, New Jersey, and New 
York) have followed the Sudomir decision, while courts in six jurisdic-
tions (Oregon, Florida, Colorado, Massachusetts, New York, and New 
Jersey) have rejected Sudomir. Notably, New Jersey and New York re-
main in turmoil on the issue, with lower or administrative court decisions 
coming down on both sides and New York’s DOH and OTDA depart-
ments coming to different conclusions as well—the former lists asylum 
applicants as PRUCOL, while the latter does not. Nonetheless, it remains 
the case that more jurisdictions have rejected Sudomir than have followed 
it. 
4. Pending Applications for Other Immigration Relief 
Only Massachusetts and New York PRUCOL regulations state that 
applications for relief generally confer PRUCOL status.352 Unlike asylum 
applications, however, there is virtually no case law on pending applica-
tions for other forms of relief other than prosecutorial discretion, adjust-
ment of status, and asylum. No court has spoken squarely, for example, 
on whether or not PRUCOL status is conferred upon an applicant for TPS, 
a Special Immigrant Juvenile visa, or a U or T non-immigrant visa. 
Only one court has opined, albeit indirectly, on the PRUCOL nature 
of an application for relief other than prosecutorial discretion, adjustment 
 
 348 In re J.C., No. UCC 90026-91, 1991 WL 441657, at *1 (N.J. Adm. Sept. 23, 1991). 
 349 Id. at *2. 
 350 Tonashka v. Weinberg, 678 N.Y.S.2d 883, 885 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (discussing Bibezic v. 
Schauseil, 236 A.D.2d 899 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)). 
 351 Id. (“[I]n Matter of Bibezic, the Fourth Department recently upheld denial of benefits 
to a person with an asylum application pending, relying on the fact that the Desk Aid of the 
Department of Social Services’ Public Assistance Source Book, which contains a list of per-
sons considered to be PRUCOL, did not include a person awaiting a determination on an asy-
lum application.”). 
 352 See 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii) (2020). 
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of status, or asylum. In Brambila v. Board of Review, New Jersey Depart-
ment of Labor and Industry, a superior court of New Jersey found that 
Carolina and Mario Brambilla were not PRUCOL for purposes of FUTA 
eligibility, even after having filed applications for temporary resident sta-
tus under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and during 
the period of time in which they were in possession of special agricultural 
worker status and work permits based on their pending IRCA applica-
tion.353 However, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed that deci-
sion.354 The Court’s reversal was effectively on other grounds, finding 
that the Brambilas were entitled to FUTA because they were “lawfully 
present,” an entirely different eligibility category beyond the scope of this 
article, and so it did not reach the PRUCOL question.355 Despite never 
reaching the PRUCOL question, anyone who is lawfully present is also 
PRUCOL, as at least one court has noted.356 Brambila thus ultimately 
provides persuasive authority for the proposition that applications for 
other forms of relief, such as temporary residence under IRCA, also con-
fer PRUCOL eligibility. 
C. Category Three: Explicit Knowledge and Permission Without an 
Application or Grant 
Category three comes up less frequently in the case law than any 
other, owing to the rare circumstance in which the government issues ex-
plicit written declarations of permission to remain in the United States 
without also granting the individual some form of categorical relief. Be-
cause these are not official statuses, they cannot be applied for or granted. 
Examples from this category demonstrate that a non-citizen need not have 
a grant of, or a pending application for, immigration relief, such as TPS 
or deferred action, to be considered PRUCOL. Rather, mere written per-
mission, absent any official category of relief, is sufficient to demonstrate 
that they are here permanently with the immigration authorities’ 
knowledge and permission. 
 
 353 Brambila v. Bd. of Review, N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 574 A.2d 992, 994-95 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), rev’d, 591 A.2d 605 (N.J. 1991); Brambila, 591 A.2d at 608 (“Be-
cause INS had not yet granted the claimants temporary-resident status, the Board denied ben-
efits”). 
 354 Brambila, 591 A.2d at 613. 
 355 Id. at 609 (“We need not address the third category (PRUCOL) . . . . We focus instead 
on the ‘lawfully-present’ exception.”). 
 356 See Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323, 334 (Ill. 1992) (“If it is conceded that Castillo 
and Jimenez were ‘lawfully present for the purposes of performing services’ from the date of 
IRCA’s passage, it makes no sense to say that Castillo and Jimenez were not also ‘under color 
of law’ as of such date. We find this to be the case because . . . the ‘under color of law’ prong 
of PRUCOL is a less restrictive requirement than the ‘lawfully present’ requirement . . . of 
FUTA.”). 
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1. Orders of Supervision 
Perhaps the most common version of explicit permission is the order 
of supervision. An order of supervision cannot be applied for but is merely 
a form of conditional prosecutorial discretion.357 The federal definition of 
PRUCOL358—and almost every state definition available—identifies or-
ders of supervisions as conferring PRUCOL eligibility.359 Berger, in ad-
dition to resulting in a consent decree that gave the first PRUCOL cate-
gory list, also established that non-citizens with orders of supervision are 
PRUCOL.360 While an order of supervision is typically provided to any-
one who first receives a grant of deferred action or a stay of deportation, 
it can be said to fall into the category of explicit knowledge and permis-
sion without an application or grant insofar as it is not a grant that one can 
apply for. Rather, the order is literally a written record that the govern-
ment conditionally promises to delay deportation at least until the date 
provided in the order.361 
2. Other Explicit Permission to Remain 
The first PRUCOL case, Holley, gave not just the definition of 
PRUCOL but also the very first example of what this third category of 
PRUCOL designation looks like. Holley did not say that Gayle McQuoid 
Holley was ever granted a specific category of immigration relief, such as 
deferred action—although, that is likely how we would classify her relief 
today.362 Instead, the opinion explained that she was in possession of a 
letter from INS that explained in explicit terms that she was not in depor-
tation proceedings for humanitarian reasons, and that this would remain 
the case until such day as those reasons changed.363 While today we would 
characterize such written permission as a grant of deferred action, the op-
tion of applying for deferred action as one would apply for other forms of 
 
 357 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h) (2020). 
 358 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(12) (2020). 
 359 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3(c) (2020); 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS. 
§ 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(v) (1997); 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C)(5) (2020); N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(b) (2020); 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3)(xii) (2020). 
Both of New York’s definitions agree on the same. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, 
§ 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(b) (2020); see N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 110, at 9; N.Y. OFFICE 
OF TEMP. & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, supra note 110, at 7. 
 360 Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1559-60 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 361 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b), (h) (2020). 
 362 Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 363 Id. at 849-50. The opinion notes that the letter from INS actually specified that 
“[s]hould the dependency of the children change, [Holley’s] case would be reviewed for pos-
sible action consistent with circumstances then existing,” showing that she was tacitly granted 
deferred action at least in large part because she was caring for six U.S. citizen children. 
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categorical immigration relief was relatively new and little-known in the 
1970s.364 Instead, Ms. Holley’s PRUCOL designation was based solely 
on the bureaucratic equivalent of a doctor’s note. 
From the Ninth Circuit came another case with similar facts to Hol-
ley. Flores v. Bowen raised the interesting question of whether or not Julio 
Flores, a national of Mexico, was PRUCOL based on his possession of 
what was known as a Silva letter.365 In the 1977 case Silva v. Levi, an 
Illinois district court issued an injunction and ordered INS to issue a letter 
to approximately 250,000 non-citizens who had applied for permanent 
residence,366 explicitly granting them permission to remain and work in 
the United States.367 These became known as Silva letters, and in 1977 
Julio Flores acquired one after having applied for permanent residence in 
1976 and being denied. Mr. Flores then became disabled and applied for 
SSI benefits.368 By this time the Social Security Administration (SSA) 
regulations had designated Silva letter-holders PRUCOL, and Mr. Flores 
was granted SSI.369 But in 1982, the Silva court dissolved the injunction, 
and SSA followed suit by declaring that Silva letter-holders were no 
longer PRUCOL—without changing its regulations.370 Mr. Flores’s SSI 
benefits were cut off, and he sued the SSA.371 In its decision, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that the end of the injunction was not followed by any rev-
ocation of the Silva letters. The higher court stated that the Illinois district 
court had held that the letters remained valid and their holders remained 
PRUCOL until such time as their letters were affirmatively revoked.372 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that SSA had not actually changed its regu-
lation, only its internal policy, and that this too was a reason Mr. Flores 
remained PRUCOL.373 Interestingly, Rhode Island’s PRUCOL definition 
 
 364 The first known case of a non-citizen filing an application for deferred action occurred 
in 1972, when John Lennon, through counsel, requested on humanitarian grounds that he be 
granted deferred action and allowed to remain in the United States while he and his wife Yoko 
Ono concluded a custody battle over her daughter from a previous marriage. See WADHIA, 
supra note 18, at 4, 16-18. 
 365 Flores v. Bowen, 790 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 366 See Silva v. Levi, No. 76-C4268 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1977), modified on other grounds 
sub nom; Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1979). Silva enjoined the INS from deporting 
certain nationals with appropriate priority dates for the issuance of an immigrant visa because 
the INS had previously allocated certain visas erroneously. See Bagues-Valles v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 367 Flores, 790 F.2d at 741 (citing Silva, No. 76-C4268). 
 368 Id. 
 369 Id. 
 370 Id. 
 371 Id. 
 372 Flores, 790 F.2d at 741-42. 
 373 Id. at 742. 
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is the only one that listed Silva letters on its list of those circumstances 
which confer PRUCOL status.374 
Also from Rhode Island is another case involving explicit permission 
to remain, Lapre v. Department of Employment Security, in which the Su-
preme Court of Rhode Island addressed the question of whether or not 
something called “deferred inspection” conferred PRUCOL eligibility.375 
Upon returning from her native Germany, Helga Lapre, a permanent res-
ident of the United States, learned after she reentered the United States 
that the length of her stay in Germany was long enough that she was con-
sidered to have abandoned her permanent residence and was now out of 
status.376 Ms. Lapre was eligible to reapply for permanent resident status, 
so she was issued “deferred inspection” status at the border upon her en-
try.377 Deferred inspection is not actually a status at all, but merely a tem-
porary pass issued by Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) when “an 
immediate decision concerning the immigration status of an arriving trav-
eler cannot be made at the port of entry due to a lack of documentation.”378 
It is unclear from the court’s opinion whether or not this pass was given 
to Ms. Lapre in writing or issued to her verbally, but the current CBP 
policy is to provide a deferred inspection grantee with “an Order to Ap-
pear-Deferred Inspection, Form I-546, explaining what information 
and/or documentation is required to resolve the discrepancy.”379 
Ms. Lapre then continued to stay in the United States for about eight 
months with her deferred inspection before she applied again for perma-
nent residence.380 The question was whether or not Ms. Lapre was 
PRUCOL for purposes of FUTA eligibility during the period of time she 
had deferred inspection.381 The court relied on Holley and its progeny to 
determine that Ms. Lapre was indeed PRUCOL because she was in the 
United States with INS’s knowledge and acquiescence.382 The court in-
ferred knowledge and acquiescence because INS told Ms. Lapre she was 
eligible to adjust her status and took no steps to deport her, also noting 
that the INS Operating Instruction at the time instructed that anyone prima 
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facie entitled to adjustment of status should not have deportation proceed-
ings initiated against them.383 Ms. Lapre’s deferred inspection permission 
was not unlike the letter in Holley, in that explicit permission from both 
the “deferred inspection” and from the INS Operating Instruction was 
given to her to remain without granting her any status and without her 
having any pending application for status. 
Another way to consider cases like Holley and Lapre: PRUCOL sta-
tus is conferred upon a person anytime the government has a policy 
against deportation for people in that person’s specific situation. How-
ever, that has been the case historically only when that policy is in writing 
or when it is inferred from the government’s habit of action or inaction. 
D. Category Four: Implicit Knowledge and Permission Inferred from 
Circumstances 
In this category of PRUCOL eligibility, no application has neces-
sarily been filed or granted, and there is no explicit policy to cite or written 
permission in the non-citizen’s possession. Instead, a court or agency in-
fers that a person is in the United States permanently with the govern-
ment’s knowledge and permission merely from the circumstances sur-
rounding the person’s case. Knowledge and permission or acquiescence 
are deemed implicit. 
The original federal definition of PRUCOL and most state defini-
tions include a catch-all PRUCOL category that seems to contemplate this 
or a similar scenario.384 New Mexico’s catch-all category, for example, 
includes “any other aliens living in the United States with the knowledge 
and permission of the immigration and naturalization service and whose 
departure the agency does not contemplate enforcing.”385 These catch-all 
categories appear to contemplate circumstances where individuals have 
neither an approved status, nor a pending application for the same, nor 
any explicit permission to remain permanently. Thus, they appear to an-
ticipate circumstances in which permission to remain must be inferred 
from circumstance. 
Several courts have inferred from the circumstances surrounding an 
individual’s case that they are PRUCOL despite lacking granted or pend-
ing applications or explicit permission of any kind. 
 
 383 Id. 
 384 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(17); see, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301(b)(3) (2020); 
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1. Deportation Proceedings 
One category of non-citizens whose PRUCOL designation remains 
a relatively open question are those who have been placed into deporta-
tion (“removal”) proceedings but have not yet been deported. While two 
different courts have looked at these circumstances, neither have given 
clear guidance. 
A very short concurring opinion in Alfred v. Florida Department of 
State Labor seems to state that someone in deportation proceedings is 
PRUCOL, at least until they are afforded their individual or merits hear-
ing.386 In Alfred, the majority opinion identified 26 Haitian nationals as 
PRUCOL because they either had valid work permits or were parolees or 
conditional entrants.387 A very short concurring opinion noted: “It is ad-
mitted that [the PRUCOL Haitian nationals] cannot be excluded or de-
ported without a prior hearing.”388 The concurring judge reasoned then, 
that “[s]ince they have not yet been granted the required hearing, it inev-
itably follows that they are residing in the United States ‘under color of 
the law,’ which grants them that right.”389 Under this interpretation, until 
an individual is placed into deportation proceedings and is scheduled for 
or participates in a hearing, they remain PRUCOL. 
Two decisions from the Supreme Court of Utah have also attempted 
to clarify the significance of deportation proceedings for a person’s 
PRUCOL eligibility. In Antillon v. Department of Employment Security, 
Baltazar Antillon, a national of Mexico, had received a grant of voluntary 
departure and a docket number with a date by which he was supposed to 
leave the United States.390 Mr. Antillon never left, overstayed his depar-
ture date, and instead filed an application for suspension of deportation.391 
In response, INS served him a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) before an im-
migration judge with the date of the hearing “to be determined,” but the 
government never scheduled a hearing.392 Based on this, the court rea-
soned that Mr. Antillon was PRUCOL because the docket number and 
NTA showed INS knew he was in the United States. The agency’s failure 
to schedule or hold a pre-trial hearing, called a “master calendar” hearing, 
proved their acquiescence to his presence.393 The highest court of Utah 
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thus appeared to say that being in deportation proceedings but not sched-
uled for a hearing makes one PRUCOL. Interestingly, the court did frame 
Mr. Antillon’s PRUCOL status as one based on his pending application 
for suspension of deportation. The court could have relied on the applica-
tion as a source of Mr. Antillon’s PRUCOL eligibility but did not. 
However, the Supreme Court of Utah may have retreated somewhat 
from the Antillon pronouncement in a later decision. In Alvarado v. Board 
of Review of Industrial Commission of Utah, Hismael Alvarado, also a 
Mexican national, applied for unemployment benefits under FUTA.394 
Following Mr. Alvarado’s application for a docket control permit or, in 
the alternative, a suspension of deportation, INS issued an NTA and 
scheduled what seemed from the opinion like a master calendar hearing, 
though no date had yet been set for a trial (called an “individual hearing”) 
to adjudicate Mr. Alvarado’s application.395 Mr. Alvarado argued that he 
was PRUCOL until such time as the individual hearing took place.396 The 
Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, finding that on these facts INS “con-
tinued to make all proper and concerted efforts to enforce the law and 
deport Alvarado” because “an initial hearing was held” on his case.397 
Both courts focused on the deportation proceedings as the source of 
PRUCOL eligibility. One material difference between Mr. Alvarado’s 
and Mr. Antillon’s circumstances was that the former was scheduled for 
a master calendar hearing but latter was not, rendering the latter PRUCOL 
but not the former. During Mr. Alvarado’s final immigration hearing, the 
judge determined that he was, in fact, deportable, which was not a con-
clusion drawn in Mr. Antillon’s case.398 The court also differentiated the 
two men’s cases by reasoning that Mr. Antillon had voluntarily initiated 
contact that led to proceedings, in which INS took no further action and 
deemed that he was PRUCOL.399 Mr. Alvarado, on the other hand, was 
arrested during a sweep operation and did not—either himself or by an 
attorney—present himself to immigration.400 Read together, these cases 
imply that whether or not an individual in deportation proceedings is 
PRUCOL depends on how they ended up in proceedings and what stage 
of the proceedings they reach. 
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2. Immigration Internment 
No case law has commented on whether or not immigration “deten-
tion” confers PRUCOL eligibility, but an unusual case from the U.S. Fed-
eral Court of Claims, Shibayama v. United States, provides an interesting 
argument for why immigration detention could confer PRUCOL eligibil-
ity. In 1988, Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act (“CLA”) to 
“acknowledge the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and 
internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Jap-
anese ancestry during World War II.”401 The CLA created a trust fund and 
directed the Attorney General to pay each “eligible individual” repara-
tions of $20,000 for their unjust internment during World War II.402 Isamu 
Shibayama, Kenichi Shibayama, and Takeshi Shibayama were three 
brothers who were nationals of Peru but of Japanese ancestry and who 
were abducted with their parents and sisters by American military forces 
on March 1, 1944.403 For reasons that are unclear in the opinion, they were 
forcibly brought to the United States from Peru and held at an internment 
camp in Crystal City, Texas.404 During their internment, they were not 
legal permanent residents or citizens of the United States.405 
The Shibayama brothers applied for their $20,000 under the CLA, 
arguing that they were entitled to it because, even though they were not 
legal permanent residents or U.S. citizens during their internment, they 
were nonetheless PRUCOL.406 Relying on Holley and Berger to make 
their point, the Shibayama brothers argued that they were in the country 
with the government’s knowledge and permission by virtue of being for-
cibly held in a government-operated internment camp inside the United 
States.407 The Federal Court of Claims did not comment on whether the 
Shibayama brothers were PRUCOL during their internment, and instead 
denied their claim because PRUCOL status is not equivalent to permanent 
resident status, and the CLA limited entitlement to persons who were per-
manent residents and citizens during internment.408 
Whether or not the Shibayama brothers were PRUCOL remains an 
open question. In fact, eight years prior to Shibayama, attorney Manjusha 
 
 401 Shibayama v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 720, 721 (2002). 
 402 Id. at 722. 
 403 Id. at 723. 
 404 Id. 
 405 Id. at 743. 
 406 Id. 
 407 Id. at 744. 
 408 Id. at 744-45. 
418 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:364 
P. Kulkarni made the same argument as the Shibayama brothers, describ-
ing it as “the most feasible alternative”409 to an equal protection argument 
for future Japanese-Peruvian plaintiffs seeking redress for their intern-
ment.410 
The analogy between the internment of Japanese nationals and the 
many thousands of non-citizens who are interned in immigration prisons 
and concentration camps today is a natural one. Like the Shibayama 
brothers in 1944, immigration “detainees” of today are held in the U.S. 
government’s custody against their will. Government custody shows the 
government’s knowledge of these non-citizens’ presence and permission 
to remain in the United States, at least until their deportation is effectu-
ated, or as Kulkarni argued for Japanese-Peruvian internees: “INS knew 
and permitted Japanese Peruvians to reside in the United States without 
formal documentation, and did not contemplate enforcing their deporta-
tion.”411 In this way, Kulkarni and the Shibayama brothers supply an ar-
gument for why immigration “detainees” may be PRUCOL. 
3. Immigration Authority Inaction Alone 
Some courts have found that PRUCOL status can be conferred 
simply by the immigration authority’s failure to place someone in depor-
tation proceedings despite knowing that the individual is in the United 
States.412 For example, suppose an application for relief is denied or an 
individual’s relief expires, but the individual is never placed into depor-
tation proceedings. They have no explicit permission to remain and no 
application for relief. However, some courts have said that if the govern-
ment has some knowledge that the person is here but responds to their 
presence with inaction, this allows us to infer PRUCOL eligibility. 
In S.W. v. Paterson City Welfare Division at Passaic Welfare 
Agency, the New Jersey Human Services and Economic Assistance Board 
held that S.W. was PRUCOL when he applied for cash assistance.413 He 
applied for permanent residence status and was subsequently denied, but 
was not subject to deportation for years.414 Relying on Holley, but also 
Antillon and Cruz, as discussed below,415 the tribunal reasoned that “even 
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without letters and documentation from INS, there is persuasive case law 
that holds that an alien is PRUCOL, where the INS knew of his presence 
but took no action to deport him.”416 It concluded that S.W. was PRUCOL 
since “the INS knew of S.W.’s status because they received and reviewed, 
but did not accept, his application for permanent residency and did not 
commence deportation proceeding [sic].”417 
L.R. v. Passaic County Board of Social Services, issued by Human 
Services and Economic Assistance of New Jersey, held that L.R., a Cuban 
national with Cuban entrant status, was PRUCOL from 1980 to 1996 
simply by virtue of receiving a stamped I-94 upon entry into the United 
States in 1980, and was thus eligible for the assistance she received during 
that time.418 The tribunal relied on Antillon, summing up its holding 
thusly: PRUCOL status is conferred “where the INS knew of [the per-
son’s] presence but took no action to deport [them].”419 The court implies 
that L.R.’s I-94 proved the government knew she was here and acquiesced 
to her presence for the 27 years it failed to deport her.420 
S.W. and L.R. open the door to the possibility that even rejected or 
denied applications, as long as they are not followed by a referral to an 
immigration court, still confer PRUCOL status on the applicant. 
Possibly the most radical of the cases involving implicit knowledge 
or inferred permission came out of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court. In 1985, the Court faced the question of whether Luisa Cruz was 
PRUCOL for purposes of federal Medicaid eligibility.421 Ms. Cruz had 
entered the United States with her mother when she was a child.422 She 
and her mother entered on non-immigrant visitor visas, which Ms. Cruz 
then overstayed, though her mother eventually became a legal permanent 
resident after marrying a U.S. citizen.423 At some point Ms. Cruz filed an 
application for adjustment of status herself, but then became terminally 
ill and entered a semi-comatose state, and her family “did not pursue the 
adjustment of status proceedings.”424 The Court noted in a footnote that it 
was unclear whether the application was “completed but never filed” or 
whether it was “filed and then proceedings were suspended.”425 
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What does seem clear from the opinion is that the Court did not care 
if the application was never filed, or filed and suspended. Instead, the 
Court found that, if the facts before it were confirmed, Ms. Cruz was 
PRUCOL.426 The Court relied on Velasquez and Antillon to note that in 
those cases, the circumstances were enough to find knowledge and acqui-
escence, pursuant to Holley.427 The Massachusetts court found that for 
Ms. Cruz as well, the agency’s inaction “warrants the inference that the 
INS has acquiesced in the plaintiff’s continued presence in the coun-
try.”428 
What makes Cruz such an unconventional decision is the basis upon 
which the Court found knowledge and acquiesce. The Court observed that 
Ms. Cruz had lived in the United States for more than 12 years, that her 
parents were an LPR and a citizen, and that the record suggested that INS 
was aware of her presence and that it could have proceeded to deport her 
but had decided not to do so.429 The Court said nothing about the adjust-
ment of status application and indeed was unclear on whether or not the 
application had even been submitted. Presumably, the Court inferred that 
the INS had knowledge of Ms. Cruz’s presence from either her entry visa 
or her mother’s immigration application history, or both, but it did not 
specify. Either way, the Court found that these facts “may fall squarely 
within the rationale of Holley,” despite the fact that Ms. Cruz lacked any 
official written permission to remain as the Holley plaintiff had.430 The 
Cruz court thus indicated that someone might be PRUCOL under Holley’s 
rationale whenever circumstances indicate that (1) the government has at 
some point received word that they are residing in the country and (2) the 
government has taken no steps to deport them. This may be the broadest 
ever interpretation of Holley. Such a PRUCOL designation would widen 
the doctrine to include a very large number of otherwise undocumented 
residents of the United States, including anyone who had ever overstayed 
a non-immigrant visa but was never placed into deportationproceedings. 
The only consideration narrowing the Court’s holding slightly is that it 
seemed to matter that Ms. Cruz appeared to be eligible for suspension of 
deportation due to her serious illness.431 
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The Western District Court of Washington may have similarly ex-
tended the boundaries of PRUCOL in Mayorquin v. Secretary of HHS. 
Guillermo Mayorquin was a citizen of Mexico who entered the United 
States without inspection and then suffered diabetes and kidney failure 
such that he required dialysis.432 He applied for SSI benefits based on 
these impairments but was ultimately denied by HHS on the basis that he 
was not PRUCOL.433 The Western District observed that Mr. Mayor-
quin’s situation was not reflected anywhere in the list of PRUCOL exam-
ples provided in the federal PRUCOL definition, but that Mr. Mayorquin 
was nonetheless PRUCOL under the catch-all provision of that regula-
tion.434 
The court was vague on the facts but observed that Mr. Mayorquin’s 
presence in the United States and his fragile medical condition had “been 
presented to the I.N.S. repeatedly by advocates for [the] plaintiff, entreat-
ing the I.N.S. to make a decision.”435 Although the opinion did not say 
whether this meant that any application had been filed or was pending 
before INS,436 there was some indication that this may have been an ap-
plication for indefinite voluntary departure.437 The opinion added that no 
action had been taken to enforce Mr. Mayorquin’s departure and that INS 
could “furnish no indication of when, if ever, it will even consider plain-
tiff’s case.”438 The only specifics the opinion gave were that “a letter from 
the district director of INS demonstrates that the agency had made no de-
termination as to plaintiff, and provided no timetable for when it would 
do so, if ever.”439 Notably, the holding of the case turned on the absence 
of a decision by the agency: 
[Mr. Mayorquin] is not required to show that I.N.S. has deter-
mined he is entitled to stay. He need only show that the agency is 
presently permitting him to reside in the United States indefi-
nitely, and does not contemplate enforcing his departure. This rec-
ord establishes that the I.N.S. refuses to contemplate plaintiff at 
all; and thus by default is permitting him to remain in the United 
States indefinitely.440 
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The Western District was not as concerned with what the letter 
showed in terms of action, but what the lack of enforcement showed “by 
default.”441 The court seemed to imply that it is permissible to look at 
what the government is not doing (enforcement) rather than what they 
have affirmatively done (letter of permission) in considering PRUCOL 
eligibility. Despite the government’s knowledge that Mr. Mayorquin was 
present, they took no steps to deport him—by their inaction, the govern-
ment showed they were permitting him to stay.442 
As a final example, recall that in Flores v. Department of Jobs and 
Training, discussed supra, the Supreme Court of Minnesota approved ap-
plications conferring PRUCOL eligibility. In that case, Minnesota’s De-
partment of Jobs and Training conceded that Ms. Flores was PRUCOL 
even after her parole had expired because INS took no steps to deport her 
months after its expiration.443 Here, too, the court upheld an administra-
tive decision that seemed to say that PRUCOL status is conferred, even 
after a status expires, for as long as the government fails to deport, or try 
to deport. 
4. Cuban Nationality Per Se 
This category of cases ceased to be legally relevant at the end of the 
Obama presidency, when it was announced that the United States would 
resume deportations of deportable Cuban nationals to Cuba.444 This has 
remained the case under the Trump regime.445 Prior to this announcement, 
owing to the unique political relationship between the United States and 
Cuba (or lack thereof), nationals of Cuba were long treated differently 
under American immigration law.446 Also making Cuban nationals unique 
was Cuba’s refusal to accept deported Cuban nationals from the United 
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States.447 In practice, for many years, that meant that the federal govern-
ment did not deport Cubans.448 While it may no longer be helpful for Cu-
ban nationals today, the following caselaw may be helpful by way of anal-
ogy for nationals of other countries that may in the future develop similar 
diplomatic relationships with the United States.   
In S.N. v. Hudson County Division of Social Services, a decision from 
New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance, S.N. was a Cuban na-
tional who entered the U.S. on a B-2 visitor non-immigrant visa and was 
issued an I-94 upon entry.449 S.N. overstayed her B-2 visa, accrued un-
lawful presence, then applied in 1997 for permanent residence status. 
Subsequently, she applied for and received a work permit that same 
year.450 Her application for permanent residence was approved in 1999 
under the Cuban adjustment law, but at issue was her state benefit eligi-
bility prior to her LPR status.451 The Division found that S.N.’s circum-
stances conferred PRUCOL status on her as early as August 22, 1996, 
when the state benefit she was applying for became available to PRUCOL 
individuals.452 The Division noted that, both in 1996, before she had ap-
plied for permanent residence or been granted a work permit, and after 
she had been out of status for several years, S.N. was PRUCOL.453 She 
had resided permanently since her entry and gave the government every 
indication that she did not intend to return to Cuba because she “routinely 
told the INS where she was.”454 The INS was aware that she was in the 
United States during this time but, inferable from their failure to deport 
S.N., did not intend to deport her.455 Thus, despite being out of status 
without any pending application for status in 1996, the Division inferred 
from S.N.’s circumstances of continued known presence and lack of de-
portation proceedings that she was PRUCOL. 
A similar case, Union County Division of Social Services v. A.P., also 
from New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance, considered the 
PRUCOL eligibility of a Cuban entrant whose one year of parole and I-
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94 had long since expired but who had not yet applied for permanent res-
idence or a work permit.456 However, the government had taken no steps 
to remove A.P.457 Relying on Holley and Solis, the Division nonetheless 
found that “the decision to withhold the removal process” was enough to 
confer PRUCOL status.458 
Inasmuch as these cases stood for the proposition that Cuban nation-
als whom the government fails to deport enjoy PRUCOL eligibility, and 
to the extent that it was policy that Cuban nationals were not deported, 
there was an argument for identifying all Cuban nationals as per se 
PRUCOL. While the recent policy change renders this argument moot, 
the history of Cubans as a group that enjoyed per se PRUCOL eligibility 
lends support to the idea that entire groups of non-citizens may be ren-
dered PRUCOL vis-à-vis official or quasi-official government policies. 
5. Immigration Authority Practice Toward Entire Categories of 
Non-Citizens 
It is useful to mention Farjam—in which the Southern District of 
New York said that an unanswered pending application for Deferred Ac-
tion conferred PRUCOL eligibility—again, because the Farjam court 
also had something to say about categorical PRUCOL eligibility. 
The court noted that the SSA’s Administrative Law Judge had held 
in a finding undisputed by the SSA’s Appeals Council that “INS has a 
long standing policy against enforcing the departure of the infirm, frail 
and elderly,” which the plaintiff was.459 The Farjam court thus seemed to 
endorse the idea that entire categories of non-citizens such as the frail or 
elderly can be considered PRUCOL when there is a practice of deferring 
the deportation of that group. Indeed, the government has had a policy for 
many years that such cases are non-priority with respect to deciding which 
individuals to subject to deportation,460 although this policy by no means 
guarantees safety from deportation in every instance.461 
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The Southern District clarified in Farjam that the phrase “does not 
contemplate enforcing” does not mean official determination or authori-
zation of the same; rather, it includes non-citizens whose residence in the 
U.S. continues by virtue of acquiescence.462 Therefore, to be consistent 
with Berger, PRUCOL includes: 
[S]cenarios in which INS does not respond to requests . . . yet in 
which official acquiescence to an individual’s presence is never-
theless present. Such a situation would be present when INS is 
made aware on numerous occasions of the presence of an illegal 
alien yet does not take action to enforce the departure.463 
Interestingly, parties before the Eastern District of New York in the 
case that would become Lewis v. Grinker made arguments that entire 
groups of individuals, such as all children and all pregnant women, were 
categorically PRUCOL because it was not then the government’s practice 
of deporting them.464 Although the reviewing court never reached or ruled 
on these arguments for procedural reasons,465 we note this case here be-
cause this argument can be useful to advocates who seek to expand 
PRUCOL eligibility in their states. 
6. Prima Facie Eligibility for Immigration Relief 
Several statutory and regulatory definitions of PRUCOL, currently 
and before 1996, include in their definition individuals who have contin-
uously resided in the United States since June 30, 1948, or since January 
1, 1972.466 Generally, any non-citizen continually residing in the United 
States since January 1, 1972, (and, prior to 1986, since June 30, 1948)467 
is eligible to apply for adjustment of status.468 What makes this PRUCOL 
category unique is that the people it applies to are PRUCOL by virtue of 
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their prima facie eligibility for some form of immigration relief, and not 
because they have applications granted or pending for the same. 
The authors could find only one instance of a tribunal accepting the 
idea that PRUCOL eligibility is conferred upon those who are prima facie 
eligible for some form of immigration relief before they apply for that 
relief: In re Barazas, an administrative hearing discussed in Castillo v. 
Jackson, accepted this argument.469 In that hearing, a claimant for unem-
ployment benefits argued that before he applied for relief under IRCA, he 
was PRUCOL after IRCA’s effective date.470 The administrative judge 
agreed with the claimant, finding “that Congress had conferred a special 
status on amnesty-eligible aliens and agreed that Barazas was PRUCOL 
from IRCA’s effective date even though Barazas was not individually 
known to INS until his amnesty claim was filed.”471 
IV. WHAT IS PRUCOL ELIGIBILITY WHEN IMMIGRATION RELIEF, SUCH 
AS DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS OR TPS, IS GRANTED 
BUT LATER RESCINDED? 
An era of grave uncertainty in the administration of immigration 
laws began in 2016, with the election of Donald Trump as president. On 
September 5, 2017, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine C. 
Duke issued a memorandum terminating Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (“DACA”),472 which began under the Obama administration as a 
means to provide work authorization and a reprieve from deportation.473 
The Trump regime alleged that such protection was unlawful: the DHS 
now held the view that the DACA program confers a benefit that required 
congressional action.474 Thus, the government declared that it was inap-
propriate for DHS to continue to protect DACA recipients through de-
ferred action.475 The practical implication of this change in policy was that 
new DACA applications would not be accepted after September 7, 2017. 
Those who were already granted DACA would also not be able to renew 
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their employment authorization documents and would lose this special 
designation that provided some protection against deportation.476 Until 
the Supreme Court of the United States restored the DACA program and 
rejected the Trump regime’s attempt to end the program,477 USCIS was 
not accepting new DACA applications. Only those with DACA applica-
tions filed prior to October 5, 2017, were able to renew their work author-
izations.478 
The termination of the DACA program created ambiguity in states 
like New York, where DACA recipients were considered PRUCOL and 
thus eligible to receive state-funded Medicaid.479 The question arose as to 
whether they would continue to be PRUCOL if the program ended and 
recipients no longer had their special designation. Through lobbying ef-
forts called the Coverage 4 All campaign,480 the legal theory and strategy 
for which was created by co-author of this article, Sarika Saxena, advo-
cates were able to successfully ensure that DACA recipients will remain 
eligible for Medicaid, despite the immigration program’s unknown fu-
ture.481 
Under New York’s regulations setting forth the eligibility require-
ments for Medical Assistance,482 the first PRUCOL requirement—that the 
federal immigration agency know of the individual’s presence—is met 
for DACA applicants. Since the DACA application has been granted, it is 
proof of the agency’s knowledge. Whether the agency is acquiescing and 
not contemplating enforcement, however, requires further analysis. 
Courts have found that the policy and practices of the federal immi-
gration agency can be used to determine this element, as in Papadopou-
los.483 The Papadopoulos court reasoned that Ms. Papadopoulos satisfied 
the PRUCOL requirements because of INS’s operating instructions that 
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it “would not take any steps to effect deportation of [Ms. Papadopou-
los].”484 Currently, USCIS’s policy to refer cases for the initiation of de-
portation proceedings does not categorically include DACA recipients.485 
In fact, USCIS protocol and procedures explicitly state that DACA recip-
ients will not be referred for deportation proceedings.486 Advocates can 
argue that DHS’s decision to rescind the executive orders creating DACA 
and no longer issuing applications establishes that the agency is acquiesc-
ing to the person’s presence. At the very least, it can be argued that a 
person’s PRUCOL eligibility extends until it can be demonstrated that the 
federal immigration agency would contemplate enforcing the person’s de-
parture.487 
Furthermore, the reason given for rescinding the program was based 
on a procedural issue and not because DHS believed that DACA recipi-
ents were no longer worthy of prosecutorial discretion. Certainly, DHS’s 
memorandum rescinding the current program has no bearing on an indi-
vidual’s likelihood to be removed and whether the immigration agency is 
said to be acquiescing to the person’s presence. Deportation proceedings 
are initiated based on an individualized, case-by-case analysis. Until an 
indication is given that DACA grantees could be removed from the coun-
try, typically done through the issuance of an NTA before an immigration 
judge, Papadapoulos might be relied upon as authority for the position 
that the agency is acquiescing to the individual’s presence and that they 
maintain PRUCOL eligibility. 
It is important to acknowledge the general nature of immigration en-
forcement as well. Rescinding or even terminating a form of immigration 
relief does not in and of itself initiate any adverse actions against the per-
son, nor does it necessarily indicate the agency’s intent to do so. USCIS, 
the immigration agency that adjudicates DACA applications, initiates de-
portation proceedings  refering an applicant to the immigrant court only 
in particular scenarios. DHS has established policies and procedures for 
circumstances in which to refer a case and serve the applicant with an 
NTA, which were last updated on June 28, 2018.488 
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Therefore, in New York, there is at least support for the argument 
that, until the federal immigration authority affirmatively puts a person 
into deportation proceedings and the person is made aware of such action 
being taken against them, the person remains PRUCOL and eligible for 
Medicaid. Until an individual Medicaid recipient has been issued an 
NTA, as described above, the person is still PRUCOL. Governor 
Cuomo’s executive team, along with the New York State Department of 
Health, agrees.489 
Starting on September 18, 2017, the Trump regime began attacking 
the Temporary Protected Status designations of El Salvadoran, Haitian, 
Nicaraguan, Sudanese, Nepalese, and Honduran nationals. Despite the 
government’s attempts to end TPS designations for these countries, the 
programs have thankfully remained in place as the result of litigation.490 
However, the question of whether non-citizens who may lose their TPS 
designation in the future would be considered PRUCOL after losing that 
designation is still unresolved. If the circumstances for DACA recipients 
are similar to those with TPS, there is no reason that arguments like the 
ones made in Papadapolous would not apply to TPS recipients as they do 
to DACA recipients. Given the nature of immigration enforcement, it is 
highly probable that the circumstances for ending TPS for certain nation-
als will mirror that of DACA. In other words, those who have their sta-
tuses terminated may receive NTAs thereafter. 
V. PUBLIC CHARGE CONCERNS 
Non-citizens seeking admission to the United States are deemed in-
admissible if the adjudicating DHS or State Department officer has reason 
to believe they are likely to become a public charge, i.e. unable to support 
themselves financially.491 Those seeking admission include those apply-
ing to become legal permanent residents but also some legal permanent 
residents returning from abroad.492 The public charge ground of inadmis-
sibility does not apply to those seeking admission subsequent to receiving 
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humanitarian forms of relief, such as asylum, VAWA, U or T visas, Spe-
cial Immigrant Juvenile or other Special Immigrant visas, or through other 
humanitarian programs such as CAA, NACARA, or HRIFA.493 The ad-
judicating officer is allowed to consider many factors in determining the 
likelihood that the applicant will become a public charge,494 but it is the 
experience of the authors that, generally, the past receipt of specific gov-
ernment benefits significantly increases the likelihood that the adjudicat-
ing officer will find that the applicant meet the definition of someone who 
will become a public charge.495  
Critical for the advocate who is advising on the receipt of govern-
ment assistance by those non-citizens who may seek admission in the fu-
ture is knowing which programs will trigger the public charge grounds of 
inadmissibility and which will not. Up until recently and pursuant to guid-
ance issued on May 26, 1999, such applicants were generally inadmissible 
on public charge grounds if they had received public assistance in the 
form of cash assistance, such as SSI, TANF, or state-funded cash assis-
tance programs, or long-term in-patient institutional care at government 
expense.496 However, on August 14, 2019, DHS issued new regulations 
that added federally funded Medicaid (excluding emergency Medicaid 
and Medicaid-funded programs for children under 21 years of age and 
pregnant people), SNAP, and Section 8 and public housing to this list of 
benefits that triggers the public charge ground of inadmissibility.497 This 
regulation is currently in effect as this article goes to publication, except 
in the Second Circuit where it is currently blocked by federal court in-
junction;498 however, advocates and several local governments across the 
country have filed lawsuits to challenge the regulations as unconstitu-
tional and impermissible and this litigation is ongoing.499 
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Practitioners should understand how the public charge bar of inad-
missibility affects PRUCOL recipients under both new and former regu-
lations. By definition, no individual designated PRUCOL will be eligible 
for those benefits exclusively available to qualified aliens, such as SSI, 
TANF, SNAP, Section 8, and federally funded Medicaid,500 so receipt of 
these benefits will generally not be of concern to PRUCOL individuals.501 
Also not of concern will be the PRUCOL individual’s receipt of state-
funded Medicaid, since this is excluded from consideration under both the 
old and the new public charge regulations.502 However, state-funded cash 
assistance is of the most concern, as it is the main benefit available to 
many PRUCOL individuals and will trigger public-charge concerns under 
both old and new regulations.503 
Also important to understanding when receipt of state-funded cash 
assistance benefits will affect a public charge determination is identifying 
whether or not the recipient had been “lawfully present” when receiving 
the benefit.504 Receipt of state-funded cash assistance will only impact the 
public charge determination if the assistance was received when the re-
cipient was out of status. For example, if a New York resident with TPS 
receives SNA (the New York cash assistance program) while their TPS 
status is active, this will not trigger the public charge bar because the 
holder of TPS is considered to be lawfully present. However, if a New 
York resident with DACA, or an approved I-130, or a pending application 
(to adjust status, for example) receives SNA, this will trigger the public 
charge ground of inadmissibility because none of these conditions are 
considered a “lawfully present” status by DHS. For this reason, practi-
tioners in jurisdictions with more expansive definitions of PRUCOL and 
which afford a more generous provision of cash assistance to PRUCOL 
individuals should proceed with the most caution. 
Finally, one special group to consider in this analysis are certain law-
ful permanent residents. Lawful permanent residents who receive their 
residence through family members or employers may be deportable if 
they use one of those benefits subject to the public charge consideration 
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within their first five years of resident status.505 Such individuals, while 
“qualified aliens,” are nonetheless ineligible for federally funded public 
benefits.506 However, they are likely entitled to the same state benefits as 
other legal permanent residents residing in the same state507 and would 
thus be eligible for state-funded Medicaid and cash assistance programs, 
which may then trigger this deportability ground. Advising these clients 
will require a nuanced understanding of their immigration history in order 
to make them aware of the risks and liabilities they may incur from re-
ceiving certain benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has discussed the history of PRUCOL and the decades 
of judicial construction and administrative applications that have framed 
its moving boundaries. Immigration regulations and the exercise of dis-
cretion by immigration authorities are fluid and far from static institu-
tions. PRUCOL was created and evolved with this reality in mind. Con-
gress intended—and the courts have reaffirmed—that the phrase is to be 
interpreted broadly and flexibly to fit this reality. This can and should be 
used to expand the term’s capacity to provide access to otherwise undoc-
umented residents with public assistance. 
Inasmuch as the practice of law involves the identification and use 
of a rule’s ambiguity in furtherance of your client’s interests, the 
PRUCOL doctrine offers plenty of opportunity to make the law work for 
your client. In jurisdictions where PRUCOL is still good law, there is 
room to push the boundaries of who is included within its pliable defini-
tion. Practitioners, and in particular those institutions with the capacity 
for impact litigation, should look to the arguments advanced in cases like 
Cruz, Shibayama, and In re Barazas for inspiration and authority to bring 
new immigration circumstances under the PRUCOL umbrella. 
The hope is that this discussion can provide practitioners not just 
with the tools and taxonomy to identify conventional PRUCOL argu-
ments (e.g., for clients with deferred action or pending asylum applica-
tions), but also to encourage and support advocacy for the recognition of 
less traditional PRUCOL categories (e.g., for undocumented children or 
clients in deportation proceedings). Ultimately, expanding our knowledge 
and understanding of the PRUCOL doctrine may help thousands access 
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life-saving public assistance and insurance in jurisdictions across several 
states. 
 
